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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In recent years, Israel has had several political disputes with its allies over their security policy. 
Though I recognise that in a larger perspective, these have been primarily minor disputes and 
the alliance partners are not anywhere near abandoning Israel. I will explain how systemic, 
domestic and regional factors can explain changes in the alliance relation. Using a structural 
realist method and alliance theory, I will argue as to how historical events have caused cracks in 
the alliance between Israel and the Western countries. By looking at alliance cracks caused by 
systemic, domestic and regional factors, I will explain how they have changed the alliance 
relationship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Israel is a small country, encompassing only 22,000 km2. Even considering its relatively small 
size, Israel has been one of the most discussed and disputed countries in international relations, 
since they declared independence in 1948. Since the declared independence, Israel has been 
involved in several military conflicts with its surrounding Arab neighbours, including different 
Palestinian organisations. 
In neo-realism we make an effort to understand the power competition and the struggle for 
survival in an anarchical international system. John J. Mearsheimer present us with a hierarchy 
of state goals, where survival is the ultimate goal to be fulfilled, before other non-security goals 
such as seeking greater economic prosperity, promoting ideologies abroad and national 
unification (Mearsheimer, 2014:46).  John J. Mearsheimer furthermore describes state survival 
as a “9-1-1 problem”, which is defined by the absence of an international authority threatened 
states can turn to for help; there is simply no alarm central nor police force that can help a state 
threatened by another state (Mearsheimer, 2014:32). The assumption of the “9-1-1 problem” 
will result in a mutual escalation of fear, as states ultimately have to rely on themselves to 
protect against threats, and therefore states seek to diminish all possible threats.  
Israel being placed in a generally hostile region, we must assume they pursue the same foreign 
policy as any other state and therefore try to diminish the threats against their state. 
In the book “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy”, which is generally critical of the 
exceptionally good relationship between the United States and Israel, one general conclusion 
from John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt is that Israel is not any better nor any worse 
than any other state in the international system (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2007). If we make the 
assumption that Israel is acting as a result of the security threats against the state in the same 
manner as any other state would react and is not “any worse”, we need to understand the 
factors which could have affected the Israeli alliance relationship. Over the past years, the 
criticism of Israel is growing among other states, also among European states traditionally 
considered close allies with Israel. One notable example is that several European states adopted 
parliamentary motions unilaterally recognising the independence of Palestine. Though, I 
recognise that the Western alliance partners are not anywhere near abandoning Israel, I 
recognise that there has been some small cracks in the alliance.  A crack can happen when 
systemic and regional factors changes the overall conditions for the alliance: If a common threat 
dissolves, if the rival states does not pose the same threat anymore or if strategic interests of 
the patron state changes. 
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Strategic behaviour from one of the alliance partners can also cause a crack. A state can through 
different domestic factors aim to get a higher degree of independence from its alliance partner. 
In this master thesis I will explore whether those cracks in the alliance between Israel and the 
West can be explained by changes in the alliance. The master thesis will therefore present us 
with some historical developments that on a systemic, domestic and regional level can have 
changed the necessity, dependence and strength of the alliance. While systemic, domestic and 
regional factors probably cannot present us with all the explanations as to why an alliance 
changes, it could present with some answers. Those answers could explain the cracks in the 
relationship between Israel and the Western countries. 
 
 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Can systemic, domestic and regional factors explain changes in the alliance relationship between 
Israel and the Western countries? 
 
 
WORKING QUESTIONS 
 
In order to help me answer my research question, I have constructed some working questions 
to guide me towards my final conclusion. Working with such a complex and wide research area 
as the alliance formation and relationship, it is crucial to have a clear focus in the argument. 
Thus, I will use the following working questions to construct my argument: 
 
x What significance did the Camp David Peace Agreement of 1979 have on the alliance 
between Israel and the United States? 
 
x Which effects did the development of a domestic Israeli military industry have on Israel’s 
alliances?  
 
x Has the development of an Israeli nuclear deterrence affected the Israeli alliance? 
 
x Has the end of the Cold War affected the alliance between Israel and the United States? 
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x Has the demographic changes in Israel affected the cohesiveness of the relationship to 
their alliance partners? 
 
x Will the rivalry between China and the United States over regional hegemony in the East-
Pacific change the alliance patterns? 
 
x Will a further integration of European foreign policy affect the alliance between the EU 
countries and Israel? 
 
 
THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
In the master thesis, I will explain whether systemic causes could explain a change in the alliance 
relationship between Israel and the Western countries. To do this, I will look at some specific 
historical events that could have influenced the alliance.  
In the first analysis chapter, I will look at the Camp David peace agreement with Egypt in 1979 
and look at whether the peace agreement changed the regional balance of power in the Middle 
East and Israel’s dependence on the Western powers to guarantee its survival and whether it 
changed the Western powers’ obligation to guarantee Israel’s survival.  
In the second analysis chapter, I will look at the Israeli military industry and investigate whether 
developments in the Israeli military industry result in Israel being less dependent on military 
merchandise and systems from the Western countries.  
In the third analysis chapter, I will look at whether the end of the Cold War has altered the 
alliance.  With the end of the Cold War, the contest over global influence between the United 
States and the Soviet Union ended and therefore I would investigate whether that changed the 
importance of being aligned with Israel. 
In the fourth analysis chapter, I will look at how the internal demographic shifts at the end of 
the Cold War have affected the Israeli alliance relationship. At the end of the Cold War, around 
one million Jews from the former Soviet Union immigrated to Israel. 
In the fifth analysis chapter, I will look at whether American strategic interests, as the leading 
hegemon of the Western alliance, has changed and whether they consequently allocate their 
military interests to other areas than the Middle East, and whether that has deprioritised Israel’s 
significance. 
In the sixth analysis chapter, I will look at whether the integration of European foreign policy 
could have affected the alliance relationship between Israel and the European countries. The 
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European Union institutions seem to be considerably more critical about Israeli security policy 
in comparison to the individual member states. Therefore I will investigate whether it will have 
a negative impact on the alliance relationship, as European foreign policy becomes increasingly 
integrated. 
 
 
PRE-ISRAELI HISTORY 
 
Through the master thesis I will explain the contemporary Israeli history and use it to describe 
the changes in the alliance relationship between Israel and the Western countries. To get a 
understanding of the history which led to the establishment of the State of Israel, I will give a 
short presentation on the most important historical events and security dilemmas which the 
early Zionist movement and the early Jewish population in Palestine faced. The pre-Israeli 
history is crucial for understanding the special nature of the Israeli state and the nature of Israeli 
security policy.  
 
Zionism arose out of a security dilemma for European Jews rather than as a result of a Jewish 
nationalism. Herzl, who in his early life believed in the total assimilation of Jews into the 
European societies as a solution to anti-Semitism, changed his opinion after observing two 
notorious anti-Semitic incidents. Firstly, he observed the increased anti-Semitic sentiments in 
his hometown of Vienna where Karl Lueger, the leader of the anti-Semitic party of United 
Christians, was elected mayor. Secondly, he was a witness of the Dreyfus Affair in Paris, where 
Alfred Dreyfus was trialled, condemned and military degraded primarily because of his Jewish 
background (Cohn, 1970:101). In one of his early Zionist manuscripts Theodor Herzl wrote:  
 
“I was turned into a Zionist by the Dreyfus Case. Not the present one in Rennes [August 
7-September 19, 1899], but the original one in Paris, which I was a witness in 1894…. For 
the Jews there is no other help and salvation than to return to their own nationhood and 
settle in their own land and territory, That is what I wrote in my book “The Jewish State” 
in 1895 under the shattering impression of the first Dreyfus Case” (Cohn, 1970:103). 
 
For Herzl, the idea of a Jewish homeland was not necessarily attached to a desire of returning 
to Palestine; it was more an idea of an unspecified autonomous territory where Jews could settle 
(Cohn, 1970:101). 
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The road for Jewish settlements in Palestine was long. However, in 1909 Tel Aviv was founded.  
The preceding ten years to the founding of the city, it had seen a Jewish immigration of 40,000 
people (Keller, 1968:173). By the start of the First World War in 1914 Palestine had a Jewish 
population of 80,000 to 90,000 Jews (Dershowitz, 2003:33). 
One of the most significant victories for the early Zionist movement was the Balfour Declaration 
of the 2. November 1917, issued by the British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Lord 
Lionel Walter Rothschild, where he promised the Zionist Movement that the British government 
supported the idea of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which in turn became a British Mandate 
after the First World War (Keller, 1968:174).  The British support for a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine lead to renewed belief among Zionist Jews and shortly after a massive influx of Jews 
to the British Mandate of Palestine started, with a total immigration of 126,349 Jews from 1919-
1932 (Metzer, 2008:222). 
The massive influx of new Jewish citizens to the British Mandate of Palestine did not proceed 
without conflicts with the existing Arab population settled in the British Mandate of Palestine. 
Due to growing tensions between the Jewish population and the Arabic population, Haganah, 
meaning the Hebrew Defence Organisation in Palestine, was established in 1920 by the left-
winged Labour Party (Bauer, 1966:182). The establishment of Haganah arose from a general 
mistrust in the local British police forces. In the twenties, there was a general perception among 
the Jewish population that they could not rely on non-Jews to protect Jews, regardless of the 
good intentions that they might have and therefore it was thought that the favourable political 
relationship to the British could prove to be temporary (Bauer, 1966:183). The security concern 
among the Jewish population of the British Mandate of Palestine proved to be justified. The 
Arab general strike in 1936 was followed by a series of attacks and murders on Jews, as well as 
crops and orchards belonging to Jewish settlements being burnt or uprooted (Bauer, 1966:184). 
Haganah’s main task was to passively defend the Jewish settlements until the British forces 
arrived, but later they obtained a more aggressive role and assisted the British forces in fighting 
Arab rebels (Wagner, 2008:631). The different Jewish defence forces also started to patrol on 
its own, outside of the Jewish settlements as a result of a power vacuum left by they British 
authorities, and as vigilantes sought to pursue the Arab attackers (Bauer, 1966:184).  
The Jewish cooperation with the British changed in 1939, when the British authorities after 
considerable pressure from Arab groups adopted the White Paper. This limited the number of 
allowed Jewish immigration to the British Mandate of Palestine to 15.000 people per year for 
the next five years (Keller, 1968:176). The White Paper and the breakout of the Second World 
War led to differentiation of activities. Mossad was authorised by the different Zionist 
authorities to run operations of illegal Jewish immigration to the British Mandate of Palestine, 
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especially under the Second World War in an attempt to save the European Jews, operations 
which continued until the Israeli Declaration of Independence in 1948 (Bauer, 1966:190). 
Haganah provided forces to the British created unit Palmach, which had the role of assisting the 
British forces in the event of a German invasion of Palestine. The more radical group Irgun, a 
breakaway group from Haganah, decided to simultaneously cooperate with the British forces 
under the Second World, while they at the same time operated a secret revolutionary army, 
targeting the British Mandate authorities using terrorist acts (Wagner, 2008:631). 
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METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this chapter I will describe the different methodological considerations for the master thesis. 
 
 
CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT METHODOLOGICAL POSITIONS 
 
I recognise that there for a long time has been a general criticism among International Relations 
scholars, that realism often does not have a clear methodological position and is by other 
scholars considered to be inconsequent in its methodology.  Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver 
criticises the ability of neorealism to operate on other levels than the systemic level. As they 
perceive the neorealist analysis: 
 
“Neorealism is built around two levels, system and unit, and is principally concerned to 
define and operationalize the system level. Neorealists either downplay or ignore all levels 
except the system one, or like Walt (1987) discuss the regional level empirically without 
considering its theoretical standing or implications.” (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:28). 
 
In the master thesis, I have deliberately chosen to focus my analysis on the systemic and 
domestic level and apply the theories of Stephen M. Walt to discuss regional implications. I am 
fully aware that security policy and alliance formation can be discussed on several different 
levels and is done so by many scholars.  Generally speaking, the main task of my master thesis 
is to give one credible explanation on the changes in Israel’s alliance relationship and I recognise 
that it is only one explanation out of many. On the contrary to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, I 
also believe it is important for the science of International Relations to have a strict delimitation 
in the field of study. Stephen M. Walt has a clear delimitation of security studies, which I 
generally use in my master thesis. As he writes: 
 
“Because nonmilitary phenomena can also threaten states and individuals, some writers 
have suggested broadening the concept of “security” to include topics such as poverty, 
AIDS, environmental hazards, drug abuse, and the like (Buzan, 1983; N. Brown, 1989). 
Such proposals remind us that nonmilitary issues deserve sustained attention from 
scholars and policymakers, and that military power does not guarantee well-being. But 
this prescription runs the risk of expanding “security studies” excessively; by this logic, 
issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessions could all be viewed 
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as threats to “security”. Defining the field in this way would destroy its intellectual 
coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important 
problems.” (Walt, 1991:213). 
 
Given this delimitation of the security studies area, I have chosen to concentrate my research 
on the systemic, domestic and regional level. As a researcher, I think it is important to know the 
boundaries of your academic skills and accept that your academic science cannot explain 
everything. 
 
 
METHODS USED IN THE MASTER THESIS 
 
As explained, realism does not necessarily have a clear methodological position and I also 
consider myself to be rather pragmatic in relation to my methods. Through the master thesis, I 
shift between different methods. Sometimes I use biographical and historical methods, other 
times I use game theory, and generally I use text analysis throughout my master thesis. 
Using a biographical and historical method enables me to document the inner experience of 
individuals, how they interpret, understand, and define the world around them (Bryman, 
2004:322). Generally, I use biographical material as secondary sources, in which other 
researchers are referring to biographical material from key actors in important historical events.   
I use some level of game theory to describe the strategic choices state actors in the international 
system make (Munck, 2001:177). By using a game theoretical approach to decision making, I try 
to understand the process of decision-making within the government and security 
establishment, and thereby analyse why they make the choices they do. 
Using text analysis, enables me to understand the substance of the text and look at how opinions 
are shaped in the language and in the context presented in the texts (Jakobsen & Harrits, 
2010:186). 
 
In the chapter, “Camp David Peace Agreement of 1979”, I mostly use a historical and 
biographical method. In that chapter, I look at historical events and historical documents, which 
I use to analyse the motives behind the decision-making and strategic advantages of making a 
peace agreement with Egypt. 
In the chapter, “Israeli military industry”, I use a mixed method where I look at both historical 
and biographical sources, as well as discussing theoretical academic texts. Primarily, I use the 
biographical and historical sources to look at the build-up of the Israeli military industry and to 
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get an understanding of the political motives behind building a strong military industry. 
Furthermore, I analyse academic texts to get a theoretical understanding of the necessity and 
strategic advantages behind a large domestic military industry, as well as describing the on-going 
revolution in military affairs. 
In the chapter, “Israeli nuclear deterrence”, I use biographical, historical and academic sources, 
as well as some elements of game theory. The historical and biographical sources are used to 
describe important events in the development of the Israeli nuclear programme and to get an 
understanding of the motives of leading Israeli persons and officials. The academic sources are 
used to get a theoretical understanding of the effects of Israeli nuclear deterrence in the Middle 
East region. The game theoretical mind-set is seen when I analyse the benefits and 
consequences behind building an effective nuclear deterrence and starting a regional nuclear 
arms race.   
In the chapter, “End of Cold War – changes in alliances?”, I primarily use historical and  academic 
sources. The academic texts are used to get a theoretical understanding of alliances and how 
they can change when an earlier threat dissolves. Furthermore, I conduct a text analysis of John 
J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt’s text “The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy”. 
In the chapter, “Demographic shifts in Israel”, I use different historical sources as well as several 
academic research sources. The historical sources are used to describe the case of Soviet Jewry 
and the academic sources are used to describe the possible changes in the Israeli alliance 
relationship after the large immigration of the former Soviet Union. 
In the chapter, “Integration of European foreign policy”, I primarily conduct a text analysis of 
different official papers, newspaper articles and academic texts. The text analysis seeks to 
uncover whether a more integrated European foreign policy will affect the EU member states’ 
alliance relationship with Israel. 
 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
In the master thesis I am going to make an intensive case study analysis of Israeli alliance 
formation: 
 
“The most common use of the term ‘case’ associates the case study with a location, such 
as a community or organization. The emphasis tends to be upon an intensive examination 
of the setting” (Bryman 2004:49).  
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In the master thesis the location of the case study is Israel and the intensive examination is the 
Israeli alliance relationship with the Western countries and how it has evolved and changed over 
years. Moreover, in my case study there will be some longitudinal elements as throughout my 
master thesis I enlist archival material and analyse sources that reflects over historical key events 
retrospectively. As Alan Bryman notes: 
 
“…case study research frequently includes a longitudinal element” and that “the 
researcher may be able to inject an additional longitudinal element by analyzing archival 
information and by retrospective interviewing.” (Bryman, 2004:52). 
 
 
EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
I mainly use qualitative empirical data in the master thesis, with some exceptions. The 
qualitative empirical data that I use includes; historical accounts, official documents, academic 
analysis and different academic journals covering Middle Eastern affairs, Israeli affairs and 
general theories of security studies and international relations. The few exceptions where I use 
quantitative data are when I am looking at military and nuclear capabilities, and when I am 
looking at the demographic developments in Israel. 
I primarily use secondary empirical sources. The exceptions are the official documents and press 
releases I use, and the article by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Foreign Policy, 
“America’s Pacific Century: The future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia, not in Afghanistan 
or Iraq, and the United States should be right at the center of the action”. 
 
 
CHOICES OF THEORY 
 
To describe international relations in general and to understand how states and great powers 
act in the international system, I have based my theoretical understanding primarily on “The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics” by John J. Mearsheimer. Israel is, in spite of its small size, a 
regional great power. 
Furthermore, to explore whether the change in Israel’s position in the international system is 
due to changes in alliances, I need a strong theoretical understanding of how alliances are 
shaped and under which circumstances they can change. To understand alliance formation I will 
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use theories of Stephen M. Walt from his book “The Origins of Alliances” and the article “Why 
alliances endure or collapse”.  
To get an understanding of how Israel conducts national security policy, I will primarily base it 
on the findings of Charles D. Freilich and his intensive research of the decision-making process 
in Israel’s nation security establishment, as he has published in his book “Zion’s Dilemmas – How 
Israel Makes National Security Policy”. 
To get a historical understanding of Israeli and Arab history, and how historical events could 
have influenced Israel’s relation to the rest of the world, I will use various historical sources that 
might have different interpretations of the historical events. While I use several sources that 
endorse the traditional historical understanding of Israeli history, I also use Avi Shlaim, professor 
emeritus in International Relations of University of Oxford, who is considered as one of leading 
figures of the Israeli New Historians, known for challenging and having critical perspectives on 
Israeli history. 
 
 
VIEW ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
 
In the master thesis, I will use the international system to explain the behaviour of the states. 
The individual states are actors in the system and the master thesis will describe the behaviour 
of the actors.   
To understand the international system, I will use an offensive realist method. My general 
assumption of the international system is that it is anarchical and there is an absence of a 
supranational authority that can regulate state behaviour and protect them from each other 
(Mearsheimer, 2014:3). Therefore, states will do whatever necessary to optimise their own 
security and proportional strength compared to other states. The world is a self-help realm, and 
in the long run I do not view it as viable for a state to rely on other states to protect its 
sovereignty, and guaranteeing security of ones population from groups that consider your state 
as adversaries. To gain security, states will do whatever necessary to optimise their own security 
and often they do so at the expenses of other states thereby optimising their strength in 
comparison to other states. 
I basically believe that states are rational actors in the international system. The rationality 
makes it possible for the researcher to predict and describe state behaviour. As Adrian Hyde-
Price notes, using the work of Robert Keohane: 
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“The rationality assumption is the crucial link between system structure and actor 
behaviour, ‘which enables the theorist to predict that leaders will respond to the incentives 
and constraints imposed by their environment’” (Hyde-Price, 2006:221). 
  
 
CONSIDERING MY OWN PERSONAL VIEWS 
 
In my perspective, one of the most important elements in security and international relations 
studies is the independence of the researcher and the aim is always to reach the highest degree 
of objectivity in the science. For many years it has been a challenge for Middle Eastern studies, 
especially studies concentrating on Israel and Palestine. Israeli and Palestinian affairs have over 
the last 30 years become a highly politicised subject. The academic field has been influenced by 
numerous interest organisations that try to influence the views of academic researchers and 
opinion makers. Stephen M. Walt sees the politicisation of research support as one of the more 
serious dangers to the integrity of security studies (Walt, 1991:230). While many Middle Eastern 
scholars conduct their research independent of support from political foundations, it is 
important for the integrity of the science that research is conducted with the highest level of 
objectivity. It is vital that personal ideology and preferences do not become a central part of the 
research, nor that they play a significant role. However, on a philosophical level, I do not think 
it is possible to conduct any science without being shaped by your own personal views. At least, 
as a researcher you need to be aware of it and do an extra effort to qualify your research and 
make the reader aware of your possible personal interests in the research area.      
Therefore, I think it is important for me to make the reader aware of my personal interests in 
my research area. There is no doubt that I clearly have Zionist sympathies and has often been 
active in the public and political debate in issues and policies concerning Israel and the Danish 
relationship to Israel. Over the years, I have also been invited as a guest of the Israeli Labour 
Party’s Knesset group and have met with several people involved in Israeli politics. Therefore, 
writing a master thesis about Israeli affairs will always demand extra methodological 
considerations and rigorous demand for qualifying my findings. Firstly, I have excluded the 
Palestinian conflict from my research, as I believe it has been thoroughly researched over the 
years and it often tends to be polemic and shaped by personal opinions. Secondly, using a 
structural realist method, I try to qualify my findings through historical events, as well as 
qualifying it through the existing theory. 
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DELIMITATION 
 
As I have mentioned earlier, I use Stephen M. Walt’s delimitation of the security studies. This 
means that there are several variables I do not work with in the master thesis. Some of the 
variables I have not worked with are e.g. political differences between the Israeli government 
and the governments of their alliance partners. Other variables I have not considered are 
domestic Israeli socio-economic, educational, and ideological variables. The only variable that I 
consider being atypical for a structural realist method is the effects of changing Israeli 
demography on the alliance relationship. However, my considerations with regards to this 
variable are in accordance with the literature of Stephen M. Walt that is used throughout the 
master thesis. 
 
In the beginning of the master thesis, I had serious considerations about conducting qualitative 
elite interviews with people working with Israeli diplomacy and security policy. However, I 
realised that it would have some serious methodological challenges to rely on elite interviews 
as empirical data.  First of all, to get a reliable amount of empirical data from interviews, I would 
need to interview a considerable number of respondents with different attachments to the 
Israeli alliance relationship. This would be very time demanding and quite costly. Another 
challenge with conducting elite interviews in the field of diplomacy is the reliability issue; there 
will always be serious doubts on whether interviewees are telling you the whole truth or if they 
are pursuing a hidden agenda on behalf of the actor they represent. 
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CAMP DAVID PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1979 
 
 
In this chapter I will examine the effects of the Camp David Peace Agreement. As Egypt prior to 
the peace agreement, was a serious military contender to Israel, I will examine how the Camp 
David Peace Agreement has affected Israel’s position in the Middle East and lastly conclude how 
the agreement in general could affect the alliance between Israel and the West. 
 
 
ARAB-ISRAELI WARS PRIOR TO THE 
CAMP DAVID PEACE AGREEMENT OF 1979 
 
Israel has consequently been at war with its neighbours since the Israeli War of Independence 
in 1948-1949, engaging in battle fights against regular armies from Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, 
Lebanon, Iraq and the Arab Liberation Army, sponsored by the Arab League (Shlaim, 2014:35).  
In 1967 the Six-Day War saw Israel winning a spectacular military victory, occupying the entire 
Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria (Shlaim, 
2014:257). The Six-Day War started with Israel launching a surprise attack on Egypt wiping out 
the Egyptian air force, still on the ground, in a few hours. Due to false information given to the 
Egyptian allies of Jordan, Syria and Iraq, they were encouraged to join the fighting and started 
attacking Israel, which resulted in the air force of Syria and Jordan being wiped out by Israeli 
forces, as well as the Iraqi airbase at H-3, close to the Jordanian border (ibid.).  
After some separate military aggressions from the end of the Six-Day War and until 1969, in the 
so-called War of Attrition (Shlaim, 2014:291), Syria and Egypt started a combined military attack 
against Israel in 1973, labelled the Yom Kippur War, as the attack was started under the Jewish 
Yom Kippur (Shlaim, 2014:323). First of all, the attack came as a surprise for Israel as the 
intelligence did not foresee the rivals plans of attacking Israel and the general perception was 
that Egypt would not attack Israel before they were able to stage deep attacks into Israel, in 
order to neutralise the Israeli air force. The perception was that Syria would not engage in a full-
scale war with Israel unless Egypt struggled (Shlaim, 2014:323). After Israel suffered military 
blows in the first round of the war, Israel was successful in turning their military luck and this 
ended with Israel suffering 2,838 dead, 103 lost aircraft and 840 lost tanks, while the Arab rivals 
suffered 8,528 dead, 392 lost aircraft and 2,554 lost tanks (Shlaim, 2014:325). The war ended 
with the Israeli-Egyptian disengagement agreement signed on 18 January 1974 and the Israeli-
Syrian disengagement agreement signed on 31 May 1974 (Shlaim, 2014:327). 
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STRATEGIC MILITARY GAINS OF CAMP DAVID PEACE AGREEMENT 
 
Between 1973 and 1983 the Middle Eastern states spent a total amount of $542 billion on 
military forces. The Middle Eastern states’ total share of the worlds arms import rose from 27.4 
% in 1973 to 42.6 % in 1983. (Cordesman, 1986:6) 
In 1977, which is reflected by the dramatic rise in Middle Eastern arms import, Egypt and the 
other Arab countries started a massive military arms build-up that threatened to alter the 
military dominance towards Egypt and their Arab allies (Frielich, 2014:80). At the same time, 
Israel became highly dependent on U.S. military aid after the Yom Kippur War of 1973, with the 
United States aiding Israel with emergency assistance under the war, as well as a multibillion-
dollar military aid programme in the following years (ibid.). Before 1973, where the war made 
Israeli-American military relationship institutionalised, the Israeli-American arms cooperation 
was limited and it was not before the late 1960’s Israel received their first aircrafts and tanks 
from United States after long and difficult negotiations. In the early years of the Israeli state the 
primary ally and military arms supplier of Israel was France, which ended abruptly with the 
French regional arms embargo in 1967 after the Six-Day War. (Frielich, 2014:101)   
Negotiating peace with Egypt meant at the same time that Egypt would not pose any urgent 
military threat to Israel. This had the strategic advantage for Israel that they could concentrate 
and allocate all military resources on deterring the military threat from Syria. The risk of a one-
front war was much comfortable for the Israeli military strategy rather than the risks of a two-
front war, involving both of the leading Arab military powers, Egypt and Syria. (Quandt, 
1986:364).  Egypt had for a long time been seen as being without any doubt Israel’s most 
powerful rival, being involved in four major wars with Israel, and for a long time Israel assumed 
that it would not be a feasible military option for the other Arab states to attack Israel without 
the force of Egypt (Frielich, 2014:80).       
At the same time, a peace agreement with Egypt secured that Israel could purchase Egyptian oil, 
necessary for upholding a strong military industry (Quandt, 1986:364). This should be seen in 
the strategic situation where Israel had no diplomatic relations with almost no other Middle 
Eastern oil producing country and at large was dependent on the United States guaranteeing 
Israel’s crude oil needs. As the first paragraph of the 1975 US-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement 
stated it “commits the US to make every effort to be responsive to Israel's "energy requirements 
and to its economic needs." (Bahbah, 1982:116). 
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CHANGES IN THE US-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
 
As described prior in this chapter, Israel had been essentially dependent on an alliance with the 
United States to secure the survival of the state, since the French government imposed a 
regional arms embargo in the Middle East after the Six-Day War in 1967. The essential character 
of the alliance was obvious in the Yom Kippur War in 1973, where Israel was highly dependent 
on arms shipment, the so-called “emergency aid”, from the United States to strike back at the 
Arab surprise attack.  
After the peace agreement with Egypt, Israel eliminated the single-strongest threat against 
them. Furthermore, Stephen M. Walt concludes that the other Arab states did not pose any real 
threat against Israel, as inter-Arab rivalries prevented an effective balancing behaviour against 
Israel, which was demonstrated by the lack of military responses towards Israel’s bombing of 
Iraq’s nuclear research facility in 1981 and Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Walt, 1987:270). 
The peace agreement with Egypt meant that Israel did not face any imminent existential threat 
anymore and Israel’s alliance with United States was arguably no longer of a character, 
necessary for the survival of Israel. 
In his alliance theory, Stephen M. Walt talks about asymmetrical dependence: 
 
“Leverage will be enhanced if the supplier enjoys an asymmetry of dependence vis-à-vis 
the recipient. For example, if a client state faces an imminent threat, but its principal 
patron does not, then the latter’s ability to influence the former’s conduct should increase. 
When dependence is mutual, however, both states must adapt to their partner’s interests. 
In short, when one ally does not need the other very much, its leverage should increase.” 
(Walt, 1987:43). 
 
According to Stephen M. Walt, we must assume that the influence the United States, as the 
patron state, possessed over Israel, as the client state, would decrease as the imminent threat 
against Israel was lowered significantly. When the asymmetry of dependence disappears or is 
lowered, then it is expected that the United States’ willingness to adapt to Israel’s interests 
would improve, and Israel would get more flexibility to act sovereignly. 
Another outcome of the Camp David Peace Agreement was that President Jimmy Carter 
promised Israel an additional economic and military support of $3 billion (Egypt was promised 
around $2 billion), here the financial promises were one of the key factor’s behind getting the 
negotiators to accept the peace agreement and overcome the obstacles (Walt, 1987:135).  
While you could expect that the additional financial aid, combined with the already considerable 
U.S aid to Israel, would give the United States some leverage over Israeli security and foreign 
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policy, Stephen M. Walt mentions that it is not always possible for a patron state to manipulate 
the level of foreign aid to influence the policies of the client state. As he mentions, it would be 
easier for an authoritarian regime to influence the client state. Authoritarian states face lesser 
internal obstacles if they want to decrease the foreign aid in order to “blackmail” the client state, 
to accept the policies of the patron state. On the contrary, in an open democratic state it would 
be easier for conflicting interest groups to interfere in the domestic political decision making 
process, which makes it difficult for the patron state to make credible attempts of “blackmailing” 
the client state, in order to control its behaviour and influence their policy. (Walt, 1987:44-45) 
Already under the Camp David negotiation process, President Jimmy Carter found it difficult to 
mention the rights of the Palestinians or referring to considerations about a possible Palestinian 
homeland, as it could have set off shock waves in the American Jewish community, which would 
instantly affect the U.S. Congress and thereby causing problems for the White House (Quandt, 
1986:362). With that in mind, a strong internal Israeli lobby and a powerful U.S. Jewish 
community means that the United States would gain a minimal influence on Israeli policies by 
raising the foreign aid. Furthermore, Stephen M. Walt mentions that it is only in very rare 
occasions a patron state can use foreign aid in alliance formation: 
 
“Aid is most likely to create reliable proxies when the recipients are so vulnerable and 
dependent that they are forced to follow the patron’s wishes even when those conflict 
with their own.” (Walt, 1987:45). 
 
As already mentioned, the vulnerability of the Israeli state was also non-existing after the Camp 
David Peace Agreement, as they where not faced by any imminent threat anymore, and it is 
therefore expectable that the power balance in the alliance would change in favour of a more 
equal partnership. However, Israel was still dependant on the United States to keep the peace 
with Egypt. In a bipolar world, Egypt would still have the possibility of changing alliance if the 
United States did not live up to their promises. Therefore, it would still be essential for Israeli 
security interests to keep an extraordinary good relationship with the United States, in order for 
them to protect the peace agreement with Egypt. 
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ISRAELI MILITARY INDUSTRY 
 
 
In this chapter, I will examine the rise of the domestic Israeli military industry in the 1970s and 
1980s. I will examine which events and circumstances that led to the rapid expansion of the 
domestic military industry and furthermore I will discuss the strategic considerations behind the 
build-up of the military industry. Finally, I will discuss the effect of a strong domestic military 
industry on the alliance relationship between Israel and the Western countries. 
 
 
ISRAELI MILITARY SPENDING 
 
From the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and up to the 1980s the military spending of Israel rose 
dramatically. In the period of 1973-1984 the growth rate of the Israeli defence budget was in 
average 1 % per annum (Ward & Mintz, 1987:88) and in 1987 the military budget of Israel was 
around $1,400 per annum per capita (Ward & Mintz:89). The upward pattern of the Israeli 
military budget is closely connected to the spending pattern of their regional rivals and changes 
in the Israeli military expenditures corresponds to the changes in the military expenditures of 
the Arab countries (Mintz & Ward, 1989:524).  The correlation between the Arab military 
expenditures and the military expenditures of Israel is closely connected to the three pillars of 
the Israeli military doctrine, which have been: Deterrence, early warning, and winning a decisive 
victory (Inbar, 1998:71). If we look at the same time period of 1973-1984, the weapon arms race 
between Israel and the Arab states is clearly illustrated by the growth of an average of 7 % per 
annum in the defence budget of the three Arab front-line states (Ward & Mintz, 1987:88). 
Therefore Israel saw the build-up of conventional military power and the weapon arms race with 
the Arab states as a way to deter the Arab states from launching a large-scale attack (Inbar, 
1998:71).   
If we look at the exact number of the specific military arms Israel imported and produced in the 
period of 1973-1984, we can see how Israel concentrated on a high number of conventional 
military arms to guarantee the territorial sovereignty and to deter the enemy from a large-scale 
attack against Israel. In this period, Israel imported and produced 500 aircrafts, 2,000 new battle 
tanks, 2,500 armoured personnel carriers, 500-600 artillery pieces, 16 missile boats, 3 
submarines and numerous air-to-air missiles, sea-to-sea missiles, and ground-to ground 
missiles; while they in the same period also introduced some of the most sophisticated weapon 
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arms systems available at the time, like F-15 and F-16 fighters, and the Merkava and M60-A3 
tanks (Ward & Mintz, 1987:87). 
If we look at the balance between domestic military arms consumption and imported military 
arms, Israel used 15 % of the GNP in 1981 on domestic consumed military arms and 12-13 % of 
the GNP in 1981 on imported military arms. Both of these numbers has increased dramatically 
over the years, whilst Israel in 1960 only used 6 % of the GNP on domestic consumed military 
arms and 2-4 % on imported military arms (Mintz, 1985:635). One of the explanations behind 
the dramatic increase in military spending was that a demand for new weapons systems 
required a considerable increase in the infrastructure of research, development, and production 
(ibid.). Both the domestic and imported military spending has increased rapidly over time and if 
we look at the amount of imported military arms it is almost identical to the amount of foreign 
aid Israel receives from the United States (Mintz & Ward, 1989:530), which would suggest that 
increased foreign aid from the United States would lead to an increase in imported military arms, 
regardless of the increase in domestic military spending. 
 
 
DOMESTIC ISRAELI MILITARY INDUSTRY 
 
One of the main reasons behind evolving the domestic military industry in Israel was out of a 
fear of losing the qualitative edge in the arms technology to the Arab states, which was 
threatened after the Arab states in the 80s and 90s started to get a considerable import of 
Western arms equipment. The qualitative edge in the arms technology was one of the main 
reasons behind Israel’s conventional military superiority, and the influx of Western military arms 
to Arab states even refrained Israel from purchasing certain advanced Western military arms to 
prevent the West from selling the same advanced arms to the Arabs. (Inbar, 1998:78).  If we 
look at the domestic arms production and the influence on the Israeli economy, it has an 
enormous effect. The Israeli defence sector received in 1989 around 50 % of all industrial 
investments in Israel, covering around 25 % of the Israeli industrial exports and almost 25 % of 
the industrial labour force is employed in companies connected to the defence sector (Mintz & 
Ward, 1989:523). If we look at the ownership of the Israeli military industry in the 80s, the 
government owned most of it either through units subject to the Ministry of Defence or less 
directly controlled government owned corporations. A smaller share of the military industry was 
owned by Histadrut (General Federation of Labour in Israel), which had been closely associated 
to the ruling elite of the Israeli Labour party. Finally, a marginal share of the military industry 
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was privately owned, generally through private partnership with the government or Histadrut. 
(Mintz, 1985:626). 
It is worth noting that the majority of major arms systems in Israel are imported and the primary 
aim of the domestic military industry has been to produce alternatives to expensive and 
unobtainable arms imports and to ensure that the state possess a capability of emergency 
mobilisation of arms (ibid.:635).  Israel did however try to establish its own production of combat 
aircrafts called Lavi, something only a handful of powers are capable of  (Frielich, 2012:100). The 
project was later cancelled in 1987 by Yitzhak Rabin, due to pressure from the United States and 
due to the cost per unit and annual expenditures far exceeding the expected costs (Frielich:103-
104). 
 
 
ON-GOING REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
 
Andrew F. Krepinevich (1994) identifies a military revolution as “what occurs when the 
application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with 
innovative operational concepts and organizational adaption in a way that fundamentally alters 
the character and conduct of conflict.” (Krepinevic, 1994:1). Even though the Lavi project in the 
end was cancelled, such an ambitious military project would generate considerable investments 
in new technology and Research & Development. Looking only at the Research & Development 
part of the Lavi project, the budget was expected to exceed $2,5 billion and involving 9,000 
engineers and scientists (Steinberg, 1987:335).  The massive research and development projects 
in state-of-the-art technology connected to the Lavi project, e.g. composite materials in the 
wings, advanced computer guidance and weapon components, as well as stealth systems (Ibid.), 
could be a driving force behind a revolution in Israeli military affairs, as military research and 
development programs has done several times in history (Cohen, 1996:41). Andrew F. 
Krepinevich (1994) predicts that a new revolution in military affairs would be the ability to 
detect, identify, track and engage with a high degree of precision and lethality (Krepinevich, 
1994:13). If we look at the Lavi project, it fostered a boost in American corporate investment in 
Israeli military industry, and especially in areas considered vital to immediate Israeli security 
needs, which from an American perspective was considered to be: Space-based sensors, kinetic-
kill vehicles, defence systems against tactical ballistic missiles, and architecture for regional 
defence against surface to surface missiles (Ryan, 1987:18).  
One of the major projects developed as an offspring of the Lavi project, and with American 
corporate investment, was the production of the first remotely-piloted vehicle, The Pioneer, 
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which was later supplemented by the production of other unmanned aerial vehicles produced 
by Israel Aerospace Industries, like the Heron and the Eitan (Ryan, 1987:21). Later studies show 
that the Israeli military industry is more likely to concentrate on protection of the individual 
soldier, in contrast to the U.S. and European military industry, which can explain the strong 
international position on unmanned aerial vehicles and other unmanned combat equipment 
(Schörnig & Lembcke, 2006:221). 
 
 
INDO-ISRAELI MILITARY COOPERATION 
 
Since the end of the Cold War and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there has been a 
diplomatic normalisation of the relationship between Israel and India. The diplomatic 
relationship between Israel and India was established in 1992 and since then this has resulted 
in a large number of military related visits, contacts and consultations between the two states 
(Naaz, 2000:973).  
The four decades without Indian diplomatic relationship to Israel has been one of the most 
controversial dimensions of Indian foreign policy and has attracted widespread attention, 
comments and criticism (Kumaraswamy, 192:2002). India did recognise Israel shortly after they 
declared independence, but since then there have been several delays in establishing official 
diplomatic representations. Initial delays due to pressing domestic problems and budgetary 
considerations, as well as the absence of formal contacts between the pre-state nationalist 
leaderships of both countries, meant that there was a lack of appreciation of each others 
constraints and priorities (Kumaraswamy, 2004:254).  Furthermore, India did have strong 
economical ties to the Arab countries, as the Arab countries were the largest suppliers of oil to 
India and the largest source of currency remittance from non-resident Indians (Naaz, 2000:973).  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union also resulted in India missing the strategic and cooperative 
relationship with the former superpower. The expertise that Israel built over the years after 
establishing a strong domestic military industry and the on-going revolution in military affairs, 
followed by the different projects, Israel did look like an obvious strategic partner for India in 
military affairs. Due to the rare nature of this contemporary Israeli military cooperation, I think 
it deserves to be mentioned separately. 
 
Firstly, Israel was keen on helping India to upgrade their aging MiG-21 fleet. Israel Aerospace 
Industries tried to get the contract for installing the electronic warfare equipment in the 
upgrade; however the upgrades was in the end given to Russia (Naaz, 2000:977). Israel and India 
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did also try to cooperate on the delivery of Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), 
where India was keen to cooperate with Israel and Israel offered to sell 3 AWACS aircrafts to 
India, but in the end they got two AWACS aircrafts from Russia. However, one of the variants is 
from a Russia-Israel joint venture (Naaz, 2000:977). Other areas in aerospace where Israel and 
India have cooperated is India’s Tejas Mk1 light combat aircraft where the Israeli firm Elisra, a 
unit of Elbit Systems, has equipped the standard aircrafts with their electronic warfare suite 
(Waldron, 2015, 12 January). Israel and India did also agree upon a joint production of the Dhruv 
helicopter between Israel Aerospace Industries and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and it is 
equipped with an advance avionics suite produced by Lahav, which is a division of Israel 
Aerospace Industries (Press Trust of India, 2007, 3 September). 
 
India has signed several deals over the years with Israel for supplying the Indian army with Israeli 
produced unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles. As described earlier, 
the revolution in military affairs in Israel gave Israel a leading position in producing unmanned 
aerial vehicles. A technology strategically important for India with regards to their border 
disputes with Pakistan. The Indian army has for a long time operated the Israeli Heron and 
Searcher drones produced by Israel Aerospace Industries, and C4ISTAR purposes (Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting 
Acquisition and Reconnaissance) (Jha, 2015, 25 June).  Lately, India bought several of the Israeli 
Harop unmanned aerial combat vehicle drones, also produced by Israel Aerospace Industries. 
According to Israel Aerospace Industries, the “kamikaze-like” drone search has an electro-
optical/infrared seeker with 360-degree coverage and can attack high-value mobile, time-critical 
and moving targets at land or sea, and with pinpoint accuracy from long range (Egozi, 2010, 9 
April).  The Harop drone would be strategically important for the Indian army to use in 
everything from low- to high-intensity conflicts, urban warfare and counter-terror operations 
(ibid.). 
 
Israel was a great source of military expertise for India when they developed their Main Battle 
Tank, Arjun. Israel did already possess the military technology through their production of their 
own Main Battle Tank, Merkava (Naaz, 2000:979).  One of the areas where the Arjun Main Battle 
Tank uses Israeli technology, is its laser warning control system, which was developed in 
cooperation with the Israeli company Elbit Ltd. (Press Trust of India, 2009, 26 May). 
 
On the missile front, Israel and India has for a long time had a strong partnership. Missile systems 
has for a long time been an essential part of Israel’s defence and deterrence strategy. After the 
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invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Iraq declared that they would use its chemical arsenal as a first-strike 
weapon against Israel. Through the Gulf conflict, Israel was clear in communicating its 
deterrence strategy. Most famously Yitzhak Rabin, then Labour Member of the Knesset and later 
Prime Minister, said in a speech to the Knesset on 18 February 1991: 
 
“What did we tell [the Arabs]? If you send missiles on Tel Aviv, Damascus will be turned 
into ruin. If you send missiles on Haifa – not only Damascus, but also Aleppo will cease to 
exist. They will be destroyed root and branch. Without dealing with missile launchers, we 
will destroy Damascus. The same applies to Baghdad. We told the Iraqis, if you send a 
missile, Baghdad will turn into dust… Israel should preserve its deterrent power simply by 
saying that in the event of a single land-to-land missile strike on Tel Aviv, then Damascus, 
Aleppo, and Baghdad will exist no more.”  (Cochran, 2000:148). 
 
Even though Israel did not retaliate the Iraqi Scud missile attack on Tel Aviv, due to pressure 
from the United States, the quote gives a clear indication of Israel’s use of their missile systems 
as an important part of their deterrence strategy. The Israeli revolution in military affairs and 
hence the expertise gained over the years by the Israeli military industry is clearly of interest to 
the Indian army. 
In January 2006 Israel and India signed a $350 million agreement to co-develop a new generation 
of long-range surface-to-air missiles for the Indian navy ships, and in April 2009 Israel and India 
signed a $1.1 billion contract where Israel should deliver an upgraded version of India’s Barak-8 
long-range anti-air and anti-missile naval defence system (Naval Technology, n.d.). 
 
Israel and India have cooperated on building Israel Aeropace Industries Super Dvora Mark 2 Fast 
Attack Craft since 1997, where India bought two of the attack crafts and was licensed to build 
another four. India later awarded the contract for production to Israel Aerospace Industries 
Ramta Divison in Beersheba, Israel and to Goa Shipyards in India (Naaz, 2000:980). There have 
also been reports about that Israeli companies having upgraded the electronic warfare 
equipment for the Indian naval aircraft carrier (ibid.). 
 
Recently, the Indian government approved a $400 million deal to purchase ten missile-armed 
Heron TP drones, produced by Israel Aerospace Industries. According to central sources in the 
Indian military establishment, the missile-armed drones would give India the strategic possibility 
of targeting cross-border terrorist camps, located in high-risk areas (Pubby, 2015, 11 
September). 
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ISRAELI STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES OF DOMESTIC MILITARY INDUSTRY 
 
A general perception in Israeli security policy, rooted in the pre-Israel Jewish defence 
organisation Haganah, is that ultimately one cannot rely on non-Jews to defend Jews, however 
good their intentions are (Bauer, 1966:183). Israel emphasised from the early independence of 
their state that they did not expect other countries to fight its battles or help them in their 
military defence of the country, a perception fostered by a general mistrust in the international 
actors, who were seen as only interested in furthering their own interests (Inbar & Sandler, 
1995:83). This perception of the overall Israeli security dogma can also be seen in the security 
concerns of later Israeli prime ministers. After the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin saw the period as one of the most dangerous in Israeli history, as Israel 
was left with only the United States as its ally. Yitzhak Rabin’s final analysis, influenced by the 
Jewish history of suffering and isolation, was that: “Israel shall dwell alone and only our military 
might guarantees our existence (Inbar, 1989:66). Yitzhak Rabin went even further in his analysis 
and when the United Nations in 1975 passed its anti-Zionist resolution, determining that Zionism 
is a form of racism and racial discrimination (UN General Assembly, 1975), and said: “The whole 
world is against us – when was it not so!” (Inbar, 1989:66). 
The aim of being independent from foreign states in terms of getting advanced and essential 
arms systems can also be seen in the strategic intentions behind the failed combat aircraft 
project, Lavi. Even though United States was seen as an important ally since the Yom Kippur War 
in 1973, the time before that United States was not perceived as an ally, and later on under the 
Ford administration United States made a reassessment of the policy towards Israel where they 
refused to agree on new arms agreements for half a year, and President Ronald Reagan 
temporarily suspended shipments of F-16 combat aircrafts on three occasions (Freilich, 
2012:102). Ariel Sharon’s analysis at that time was: “I always regarded aircraft as a political 
weapon. Every time somebody wanted to threaten or pressure us, the first step was to stop 
selling planes.” (Ibid.:102). 
The strategic aim for self-sufficiency of arms was also fostered in several historical incidents 
where Israel found themselves in lack of sufficient arms, which resulted in serious security 
threats, like the War of Independence, the French arms embargo of 1967, and the surprise attack 
of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 (Mintz, 1985:636). Another important perspective of being self-
supplied of strategic important arms was that the arms race between Israel and the Arab states 
left Israel with a need for increased military aid from United States that in turn got to determine 
the total amount of arms imports (Ward & Mintz, 1987:94). Being self-supplied of essential arms 
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systems would give Israel the strategic advantage of deciding the amount and the specific arms 
available. Furthermore, the freedom of being self-supplied in strategic important arms left Israel 
with a minimised need for external arms support, and hence ruled out the possibility of 
intervention from foreign countries in Israeli national security matters and military actions. The 
fear of being restricted in the freedom of action was seen when Israel unsuccessfully tried to 
become a formal member of the Western alliance, but later abstained from pursuing an official 
membership, as they realised that a formal alliance membership could affect their freedom of 
action. (Inbar & Sandler, 1995:45).  
 
 
EFFECT OF THE DOMESTIC MILITARY INDUSTRY 
 
Being self-supplied of most major arms system would make Israel less prone to pressure from 
the United States and other arms suppliers to Israel. As demonstrated, United States used 
deliverances of arms, e.g. F-16 combat aircrafts, on several occasions as a blackmailing tool to 
get leverage on Israeli security policy. As Israeli national security has been under considerable 
pressure from surrounding Arab states, drastic measures could be necessary for Israel, which 
could result in Israel losing import alliance partners, like the French arms embargo of 1967. 
Therefore being self-supplied in arms would give Israel strategic space to do whatever necessary 
in order to protect themselves against threats from rival states, without fearing the loss of 
important alliance partners leaving Israel in a security vacuum.  
Even though the Lavi combat aircraft project was cancelled, and consequently Israel still being 
dependent on combat aircraft deliveries from the United States, a strong conventional land 
based defence force would still allow Israel to get some strategic independence. In a situation 
where the core objective of Israel’s security concerns was protection of its land territory from 
invasion, land force would be the absolute most important military power. John J. Mearsheimer 
mentions that land power is the most dominant form of military power (Mearsheimer, 2014:83). 
While air forces can aid the aerial firepower of armies, their ability to directly protect territory 
is limited. Additionally, it is difficult to destroy a rival state’s economy solely by strategic 
bombing, and in turn the rival state’s ability to engage in war. Moreover, rival states will rarely 
be willing to surrender after being exposed to enormous amount of punishment from strategic 
bombing attacks (ibid.:86). 
 
 
 
 31 
CHANGES IN ALLIANCES 
 
Israel has been successful in a large internal balancing manoeuvre in building a large domestic 
military industry, making them self-sufficient of key strategic military weaponry. Most 
importantly, this resulted in a regional change in the balance of power in the Middle East. The 
shift from being primarily an importer of military arms to becoming a major exporter of military 
arms has affected Israel’s position in the international system. The domestic factor of having an 
effective deterrence and being self-sufficient in an international systemic anarchy, emphasising 
the need for self-help makes it less important to make external balancing through an 
indissoluble alliance relationship. The change would result in Israel’s alliance partner’s having 
less leverage over Israeli policy and allowing Israel to have a higher degree of freedom to pursue 
their policy on their own, which is the core essence of Israeli security policy.   
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 32 
ISRAELI NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
 
 
In the late 1950’s, Israel started developing a nuclear program. The strategic reason behind 
acquiring nuclear weapon capacity was primarily to ensure its sovereignty, even if Israel was 
defeated in a conventional war by its Arab rivals. At the same time, Israel wanted to insure itself, 
in the event of Arab countries acquiring nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Israel was of the belief 
that they could not rely on friendly countries to help them if a military defeat was obvious. 
(Inbar, 1996:45). Israel also saw a disinterest in Israeli security affairs from the international 
organisations and the general consensus was that Israeli security should be upheld by military 
predominance rather than diplomatic negotiations, international intervention or foreign 
alliances, which fostered the wish for a nuclear weapons capacity (Bell, 1972:383). Furthermore, 
Israel wanted to stay ahead of the Arab states in a potential revolution in military affairs and 
wanted to ensure that it possessed more advanced skills and foreign contacts which could 
guarantee the lead in a nuclear arms race, if such a race where to happen within the Middle East 
region (Cochran, 2000:132). 
Shimon Peres, as the Director-General of the Israeli Ministry of Defence and later Deputy 
Defence Minister, was responsible for the development of Israel’s nuclear programme in the 
50’s and 60’s, and arranged the funding, partially funded from private sources in United States, 
as well as developing the long nuclear collaborative relationship with France (ibid.:133). Personal 
relationships could be a factor behind the initial strong Franco-Israeli nuclear relationship as 
many of the post-war French atomic scientists were Jewish, and many left-winged French 
scientists had close ties to the French Socialist Party who, at the same time, had close ties to the 
Israeli Labour Party (ibid.:135). The strong relationship with the French on developing nuclear 
technology was ended abruptly in 1967, with the French weapon’s arms embargo (ibid.: 138).  
Israel decided to build the first nuclear reactor in 1957 and the Dimona reactor was completed 
around 1960-1961 and was kept secret until 1960 (ibid.:136). The initial supply of deuterium for 
the Dimona reactor was bought in 1959 from the Norwegian company Norsk Hydro (ibid.:137).   
The Israeli government chose a strategy where they officially refused to recognise the existence 
of a nuclear weapon’s program and refrained from openly testing the bomb. On the contrary, to 
have an effective nuclear deterrence, Israel’s rivals needed to know that Israel possessed an 
effective nuclear weapon’s capacity. Therefore the Israeli government pursued a strategy where 
deliberate leaks, implicit statements, rumours and political actions, like refusing to sign the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, should bolster the rivals’ awareness on Israel’s nuclear 
capabilities and nuclear deterrence doctrine. (Maoz, 2003:46-47). The nuclear weapon’s 
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programme was finally publicly leaked when the disaffected nuclear technician Mordechai 
Vanunu in 1986, leaked notes about the operations and photographs to the London Sunday 
Times (Cochran, 2000:146).  
The core elements of Israeli nuclear deterrence do however present a big dilemma. As the 
geography of the Middle East is very dense and the Arab rival states are located close to Israel’s 
borders, launching a nuclear attack on a rival, even if used as last resort, Israel will have to deal 
with the serious possibility of nuclear fallout in their own country. The likely scenarios of nuclear 
fallout in Israel if a nuclear attack was launched, could seriously question the credibility of the 
Israeli nuclear deterrence towards its rivals located close to Israel’s borders (Cobban, 1988:417). 
These credibility questions about the Israeli nuclear deterrence could be solved by the 
technologically evolution of nuclear weapons, like tactical nuclear weapons and acquiring 
second-strike capability, in order to deter the enemy from launching the initial nuclear attack. 
According to a 2012 report from the German magazine Der Spiegel, the intentions behind the 
six Dolphin-class submarines Germany has delivered to Israel over time, was to give Israel 
second-strike capability in case of a nuclear attack (Ferber & Maltz, 2015, 12 May). 
 
 
CURRENT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
 
As the Israeli state has a strategy of neither confirm nor deny their nuclear programme, it is 
naturally not possible to get any official data of their nuclear deterrence. Over the years, there 
have been several reports from the media, think tanks, security studies scholars and analysts 
estimating the Israeli nuclear arsenal to possess everything from 75 to more than 400 nuclear 
warheads (Kristensen & Norris, 2014: 102). One of the more credible estimates of how many 
nuclear warheads Israel possess is the leaked classified report from US Defense Intelligence 
Agency from 1999, that estimated Israel in 2020 would possess 65-85 nuclear warheads 
(Kristensen & Norris, 2014:104). 
The Israeli Air Force has over the years had several aircraft models with the possibility of air 
delivery of nuclear weapons. Currently they have over 200 F-16s fighter aircrafts of all types, 
including the Israeli modified F-16I Sufa, and the Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle, they have also 
ordered 20 of the 2012 F-35A design and have plans to buy over 100 new Israeli modified design 
F-35I Adir (Kristensen & Norris, 2014:106). 
Israel also possesses a greater arsenal of land-based missiles with the capabilities of delivering 
nuclear weapons. Israel deployed the Jericho 2 medium-range ballistic missiles in the early 
1990s, replacing the first generation of Jericho short-range ballistic missiles, which according to 
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the US Air Force National Intelligence Center is believed to have a range of 1,500 kilometres and 
most sources estimate that Israel posses around 50 Jericho 2 missiles (Kristensen & Norris, 
2014:106). At the moment, Israel is testing an improved Jericho 3 intercontinental ballistic 
missile with an estimated range of 4,000 kilometres. Unidentified military sources have called 
the Jericho 3 missiles a dramatic leap in Israel’s missile capabilities, as it will make it possible for 
Israel to target all of Iran, Pakistan, and all of Russia, the west of the Urals, including Moscow 
(Ibid.). 
As mentioned earlier, Germany has delivered a total number of six Dolphin-class submarines, 
providing a second-strike nuclear capability. Most likely, Israel has equipped the submarines 
with Popeye Turbo submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM), a modification of their 
conventional Popeye Turbo air-to-surface missiles produced by Rafael Advanced Defense 
Systems (Kristensen & Norris, 2014:108). According to Der Spiegel, further development of the 
Popeye Turbo SLCM is supposed to have a range of around 1,500 kilometres, which could reach 
Iran delivering nuclear warheads weighing up to 200 kilograms (Spiegel, 2012, 4 June).  
 
 
STRATEGIC AIMS BEHIND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE 
 
One of the most obvious reasons behind acquiring an effective nuclear weapons arsenal is that 
other states would not dare to attack you because of the fear of being annihilated 
(Mearsheimer, 2014:128). Having the Yom Kippur War in mind, where United States’ 
rearmament of the Israeli army was essential in preventing a defeat, a nuclear arsenal can serve 
as a guarantee for survival, even when conventional forces are outnumbered. Most Israeli 
military strategist would agree that the nuclear programme has succeeded in serving as a 
guarantee for their survival, as it has prevented a large-scale Arab attack with the strategic aim 
of annihilating Israel, since it became known to the Arab rivals that Israel possessed a nuclear 
capacity (Maoz, 2003:47).   
At present time, Israel is still the only Middle Eastern state possessing nuclear weapons. John J. 
Mearsheimer (2014:129) writes that “the best way for a state to achieve nuclear superiority is 
by arming itself with nuclear weapons while making sure no other states has them. A state with 
a nuclear monopoly, by definition, does not have to worry about retaliation in kind if it unleashes 
its nuclear weapons.”  Some Israeli military strategists will argue that one of the main strategies 
behind Israel building a nuclear arsenal was to deter the Arabs from producing their own nuclear 
arsenal, and hence uphold a nuclear hegemony in the Middle Eastern region (Cobban, 
1988:417).  
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Being a regional nuclear hegemon and upholding nuclear superiority is, however, difficult in the 
long run as rival states would try to contest your superior position. John J. Mearsheimer 
(2014:130) writes on nuclear rivalry that “every great power would like to achieve nuclear 
superiority, but it is not likely to happen often, and when it does occur, it probably is not going 
to last for a long time. Non-nuclear rivals are sure to go to great lengths to acquire nuclear 
arsenals of their own, and once they do, it would be difficult, although not impossible, for a great 
power to reestablish superiority by insulating itself from nuclear attack.” 
In the case of Israel, you can see the same pattern on their rival states’ attempts to acquire their 
own nuclear arsenal, with Iraq and Syria as previous examples and the Iranian nuclear policy as 
a present attempt to nuclearise and contest Israel’s position as regional nuclear hegemon 
(Adamsky et al., 2011:156). Attempts that some military strategists reckon are spurred on 
directly by the Israeli nuclear policy (Cobbas, 1988:417). 
 
 
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCE 
 
As long as it is possible for Israel to uphold a regional nuclear hegemony, Israel will have a strong 
advantage with regards to the regional power balance. Stephen M. Walt mentions: 
 
“…an alliance may erode if its members acquire other means to protect their interests. 
Here the need for allies declines not because the external danger is gone, but because one 
or more members have become more capable of meeting it on their own. Such a shift may 
occur because the allies’ capabilities are growing faster than those of their rival(s), or 
because changes in the nature of military technology make it difficult for opponents to 
attack.” (Walt, 1997:159). 
 
Israel deliberately sought to acquire a nuclear weapons arsenal, as they did not want to rely on 
friendly countries to save them in the case of an obvious conventional military defeat (Inbar, 
1996:45). Furthermore, introducing the nuclear weapons technology, Israel made it very difficult 
for their enemy states to attack Israel, as it gave Israel the most absolute deterrence: the threat 
of annihilating any attacking countries. 
If Iran successfully nuclearise, it could present Israel and their allies with some serious strategic 
dilemmas. In a situation with a nuclear Iran, it would be expectable that the Iranian proxies and 
Israeli adversaries, like Hezbollah, Hamas and the Assad regime, would feel protected by the 
Iranian nuclear umbrella, which would mean that Israel could expect more aggressiveness, 
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without Israel having the same military freedom to strike back (Adamsky et al., 2011:157). In this 
situation, Israel’s nuclear strategy could backfire and leave Israel even more fragile and probably 
more dependent on great power allies to control the situation and put political pressure on Iran.  
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END OF COLD WAR 
 
 
In this chapter, I will describe and explain how the end of the Cold War changed the alliances of 
the Middle East. Where the Middle East under the Cold War was a highly contested region for 
both superpowers, United States and Soviet Union, I will explore how the end of the Cold War 
affected Israel’s relationship with the Western Countries and their alliance. 
 
 
ALLIANCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST UNDER THE COLD WAR 
 
Under the Cold War, the Middle East was a highly contested geographical area for the United 
States and the Soviet Union, where both superpowers tried to build alliances with Middle 
Eastern countries, and subordinate them into a client-state relationship, in order to balance the 
other superpower. In his book “The Origin of Alliances”, Stephen M. Walt (1987, 154) has listed 
modern alliances in the Middle East, in order to describe both the motive of the client state and 
the superpower. In order to give a better understanding of the later Cold War alliance formation 
in the Middle East, I will present the relevant findings of Stephen M. Walt.  
At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had an alliance relationship with Syria and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, where the motive for Soviet Union was to balance the 
United States. For Syria the motive of the alliance was to balance Israel. Until 1975 Soviet Union 
was also aligned with Egypt, where it slightly shifted towards an alliance with the United States. 
One of the reasons for Egypt to align with Soviet Union was to balance Israel, but, as described 
in an earlier chapter, the possibility of gaining peace with Israel and receiving economic aid from 
the United States made them change alliance partner.    
If we look at United States, until the end of the cold war, they were aligned with four Middle 
Eastern countries, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, all with the motive of balancing the 
Soviet Union. The motive for Israel was to balance the Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to 
balance Egypt, and finally Egypt’s motive was to gain peace with Israel and receive economic aid 
from United States. Israel clearly played an important role for United States, serving as a proxy 
state in a region with strong strategic interests for both superpowers. In the following chapters 
I will look at how it would have affected Israel’s relationship to United States and the importance 
of their alliance after the threat of the Soviet Union diminished and by that United States’ need 
to balance against the threat, which according to Stephen M. Walt was their main motive behind 
the alliance with Israel. 
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THE DISSOLVED SOVIET THREAT 
 
As demonstrated by Stephen M. Walt’s examination of alliances under the Cold War in the 
Middle East, the main motive for United States to align with Middle Eastern countries, including 
Israel, was to balancing the Soviet Union. After the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 
late 1991 and the beginning of the period with uncontested U.S. unipolarity the need for the 
United States to align with Israel, in order to balance a posing threat, would diminish as well. 
Stephen M. Walt mentions that “an existing alliance is likely to dissolve if the states that posed 
the original threat become much weaker, because the members of the alliance will have less 
need for external support.” (Walt, 1997:158). In an earlier chapter I explored how the Camp 
David Peace Agreement of 1979 changed the Israeli threat perception, because the threat from 
the Arab states got much weaker, and how it would affect Israel’s alliance relationship to United 
States. In the same way, the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat would affect the United 
States’ essential strategic need for a strong alliance relationship to Israel and as long the United 
States have no great power rivals, they have less need for allied support and thus a greater 
capacity to act alone (Walt, 2009:94). In continuation of his point, Stephen M. Walt also 
mentions that “alliances are also likely to dissolve if one of its members become significantly 
stronger, both because the rising power will have less need for allied support and because the 
other members may begin to view it as a threat to their security.”  (Ibid.:159). Even though the 
United States always being the definitive strongest partner of their alliances, the start of the 
period with U.S. unipolarity after cold war left the world in a situation where the U.S. power was 
uncontested worldwide and the need for allied support was minimal. At the same time, the long 
experience in Jewish history of isolation, insecurity and Holocaust, also reproduced a general 
Israeli mistrust in international actors, whom were seen as only interested in their own interests 
(Inbar & Sandler, 1995:45). This could indicate that the loss of clear interests for the United 
States in aligning with Israel, as well as the United States being the only unipolar superpower, 
could have the effect of a starting Israeli mistrust in the credibility and intentions of United 
States as an alliance partner.  
 
 
REASONS FOR CONTINUATION OF ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP 
 
Game theory suggests that an alliance is only formed when all participants believe they can do 
better in an alliance than they could do by themselves (Snyder, 1997:144). While it is more 
obvious that Israel receives significant foreign military support and foreign aid, as described in 
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earlier chapters, from its alliance partners and most significantly United States, the end of the 
Cold War made it less obvious, as to why the Western Countries would do better in an alliance 
with Israel, instead of acting on their own. Especially some of the European countries had on 
several occasions seen their relationship with Israel as being in conflict with their long-term goals 
in the Middle East, often involving being on good terms with the Arab countries. E.g. the Arab 
countries used the weapon of imposing oil embargo on European countries to pressure the 
Dutch government to agree upon the 6 November EC statement of 1973, recognising the 
legitimate claims of Palestine, and all European countries refused to allow United States to use 
their military bases for rearming Israel under the Yom Kippur War of 1973 (Licklider, 1988:216). 
Even though, the Arab countries were successful in pressuring European countries to make 
minor shifts in their policy towards Israel, Roy Licklider (ibid.) mentions that it was only vague 
and subtle changes in the policies. John J. Mearsheimer (2014: 152) also mentions that 
blackmailing very rarely are successful and that “great powers, by definition, have formidable 
military strength relative to each other, and therefore they are not likely to give in to threats 
without a fight. Blackmail is more likely to work against minor powers that have no great-power 
ally.”  Even though a strong alliance relationship with Israel could be in conflict with some of the 
Western countries, long-term strategic goals in the Middle East region, a direct abandonment 
of Israel as an alliance partner would have more severe effects on the unity of the other alliance 
partners. Glenn H. Snyder (1997:183) mentions that the primary goal of alliance management is 
to avoid abandonment and holding the alliance together. Firstly, if Western countries started to 
abandon Israel on important issues, others might start to see the alliance as being faithless and 
in lack of solidarity. Stephen M. Walt (1997:160) writes that “an alliance may dissolve if its 
members begin to question whether their partners are genuinely committed to provide 
assistance”.  Stephen M. Walt (ibid.) mentions that this problem will be more severe if the allies 
are geographically separated, and hence not necessarily exposed to the same threats.  In order 
to prevent allies from fearing abandonment in the alliance, Glenn H. Snyder (1997:184) writes 
that “allies that are concerned about abandonment will wish to establish a reputation for loyalty 
so as to maintain the attractiveness of the alliance for the partner”. This suggests that a lack of 
loyalty towards Israel would affect the attractiveness of the alliance and probably other alliance 
partners would fear being abandoned on important security matters.  
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THE AMERICAN ACADEMIC CRITICISM OF THE U.S.-ISRAELI ALLIANCE 
 
Although I theoretically use John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt continuously in my thesis, 
both of them are well known as the authors behind one of the biggest academic controversies 
in the field of international relations in recent years. Together in 2006 they wrote the working 
paper “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy”, which in 2007 was published as a book. The 
general conclusion of Mearsheimer and Walt is that the very close relationship and support for 
Israel is jeopardising the security of the United States, as the unprecedented close relationship 
has a negative effect on Arabic and Islamic opinion towards United States (Mearsheimer & Walt, 
2006:1). Specifically, Mearsheimer and Walt sees post-Cold War Israel as being a strategic 
liability for United States and U.S. support for Israel is seen as an important reason for anti-
American terrorism, like they, based on the U.S. 9/11 Commission, concludes that some of the 
main factors behind Osama bin Laden’s terror attacks was to punish United States for its policies 
in the Middle East, including its support for Israel (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006:5). In their 
criticism of Israeli influence on U.S. foreign policy they define a presence of an internal Israeli 
lobby in United States, with AIPAC (American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee) as the front-
runner who, according to Mearsheimer and Walt, is “a de facto agent for a foreign government” 
and that AIPAC “has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006:18).  
Mearsheimer & Walt estimates that the Israeli lobby have significant leverage over the Executive 
branch in the United States, partly due to an estimation that up 60% of the campaign budget of 
Democratic presidential candidates are supplied by Jewish supporters and partly due to high 
turn-out rates for Jewish voters and high concentration of Jewish voters in electoral key states 
(ibid.). Another accusation against the Israeli lobby is that pro-Israeli organisations work 
specifically hard to influence the media, think tank, and academia, because the lobby sees those 
institutions as being crucial in shaping the popular opinion of the United States (Mearsheimer & 
Walt, 2006:20). 
Another important argument from the Mearsheimer & Walt criticism of the Israeli lobby is that 
the lobby and the Israeli government is a critical element behind pressuring for what they assert 
is a failed U.S. foreign policy (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006:30). Specifically, Mearsheimer and Walt 
assert that pressure from the internal Israeli lobby and the Israeli government played a central 
part in influencing the Bush administration and the American population to invade Iran 
(Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006:31-32). 
Many scholars have disagreed with Mearsheimer & Walt’s findings and criticism of the so-called 
Israeli lobby, with Harvard law school professor Alan Dershowitz as one of the most outspoken 
critics.  
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First of all, it seems to be an undocumented accusation that Jewish voters in general possess a 
dual loyalty and that campaign funds from Jewish supporters is given with a demand of political 
support for Israel. The accusation of dual loyalty and that the Zionist leadership, and the Jewish 
population in general, acts as foreign agents for Israel is quite similar to the anti-Zionist 
sentiments produced in the Soviet Union, which I will look upon in the next chapter. Alan 
Dershowitz points out, these accusations against the American Jewish community must be 
because of unfamiliarity with the American Jewish community which, according to Dershowitz, 
thrives on controversy and different opinions about Israeli public officials (Dershowitz, 2006:36). 
Actually, recent studies from the 2012 American election shows that only 4% of registered 
American Jewish voters think that the relationship to Israel is the most important political issue 
(Jones & Cox, 2012:11), which obviously questions the claims that Jewish campaign funds and 
voter turn-out is usable for the Israeli lobby to get leverage over the Executive branch of the 
United States.  
The claim that the Israeli lobby and the Israeli government was a critical element behind 
pressuring the Bush administration to invade Iraq is highly debatable and other sources, than 
those used by Mearsheimer & Walt, reports that the then-Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon 
advised George Bush not to invade Iraq, while other sources reports that Ariel Sharon would not 
push one way or another in regards to an invasion of Iraq (Dershowitz, 2008:58). 
 
 
SYSTEMIC CHANGES AS A DRIVING FACTOR 
BEHIND THE ACADEMIC CRITICISM 
 
Even though I generally disagree with John J. Mearsheimer & Stephen M. Walt’s views on Israel, 
I do find their criticism relevant for explaining how the systemic changes and the dissolution of 
the Soviet threat has changed senior American scholars view on Israel, even among realist 
scholars, who traditionally have had the basic assumption that the international system is a self-
help realm and therefore must decide for themselves which means should be deployed to 
achieve their security goals (Toft, 2003:2). One relevant point from their working paper: 
 
“Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War. By serving as America’s proxy 
after the Six Day War (1967), Israel helped contain Soviet expansion in the region and 
inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria. Israel occasionally 
helped protect other U.S. allies (like Jordan’s King Hussein) and its military prowess forced 
Moscow to spend more backing its losing clients. Israel also gave the United States useful 
intelligence about Soviet capabilities.” (Mearsheimer & Walt, 2006:4). 
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Mersheimer and Walt (ibid.) continues their analysis concluding that after the end of the Cold 
War, Israel has become a strategic burden for the United States.  Clearly, they see Israel as being 
irrelevant to the United States due to the systemic shifts in the global system that have 
happened after the dissolution of the Soviet threat. Although, I do not consider Mearsheimer & 
Walt’s criticism of the U.S.-Israeli alliance relationship to be mainstream and recognise that their 
publication have had professional and academic consequences for both of them  (see interview 
with Stephen M. Walt in: Shalev, 2014, 17 April), a criticism of the U.S.-Israeli alliance 
relationship from two of the most prominent academic scholars in International Relations theory 
will, at least to some extent, influence the general opinion of professionals in the field Diplomacy 
and International Relations. 
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DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS IN ISRAEL 
 
 
After the Cold War, Israel made an enormous effort to absorb the Jews from the Soviet Union in 
their state. First of all, the Soviet regime hampered the possibility of Jewish immigration from 
the Soviet countries and their proxy states. Secondly, the result of the policy of the Soviet regime 
was that the Jewish intelligentsia was slightly eliminated, as well as Jewry in general being 
suppressed. Rabbis and other religious leaders, teachers and scholars were imprisoned. The 
Hasidic movement was atomised and went into an underground existence. The Zionist 
leadership was imprisoned, liquidated or permitted to leave the country. (Decter in Glazer et al., 
1971:11).  Furthermore, on several occasions the Jews of Soviet Union were accused of acting 
as foreign agents from Israel and the United States trying to overthrow the Soviet rule, an 
accusation that was widely published by different official party publications and mass media  
(see various examples in: Korey in Glazer et al., 1971:55-61).  
The long-time suppression of Soviet Jewry and the clear anti-Semitic environment that was an 
integrated part of the thinking and daily-life in the former Soviet countries and Eastern Europe 
in general, made it a top political priority to absorb the Soviet and Eastern European Jews in the 
state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, almost one million Jews immigrated to Israel, 
boosting the Jewish population with around 20 % (Toft, 2012:27).  
 
 
ANTI-SEMITISM IN PRE-SOVIET RUSSIA 
 
Anti-Semitic incidents in Russia have strong historical roots from the time before the creation of 
the Soviet Union. Especially in the late nineteenth century imperial Russia saw a uprising of anti-
Semitic actions, peaking in 1871 with a series of violent pogroms killing a large number of 
arbitrary and innocent Jews (Kolstø, 2014:691). Anti-Semitism was also seen in a clear form with 
specific legalisation aiming at restricting the freedom of movement and occupational 
opportunities for Jews, as well as a there being designed a system of numerous clausus to limit 
the access to higher education for Jews (ibid.). As a historical side note it is worth noting that 
one of the most recognised theories of the origin of “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” credit 
Pjotr Rackovskij, the chief of the Okhrana - imperial Russia’s secret police, for ordering the 
production of the protocols, which is the most well-known and widespread anti-Semitic 
conspiracy in modern time (Thing, 2014:13).  
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Another well-known and widespread anti-Semitic conspiracy text from imperial Russia is V. 
Mordvinov’s “The Secrets of Talmud and the Jews in Their Relations to the Christian World” from 
1880. In the text V. Mordvinov makes several outright distortions of the text in the Talmud, e.g. 
the well-known anti-Semitic prejudice that is allowed for Jews to steal from Christians. As V. 
Mordvinov argues, the Mosaic prohibition on stealing from people does not apply to Christians, 
as Jews consider Gentiles to be cattle and not human. (Kolstø, 2009:46). The mistranslation of 
the Yiddish word “Goyim”, meaning Gentiles, into meaning cattle or dogs is widespread in anti-
Semitic literature and is also used in “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” (Thing, 2014:10). 
Some of the typical explanations on the up rise of anti-Semitism in Russia and why the imperial 
Russia succumbed to introducing anti-Semitic legislation was because of pressure from several 
important lobby groups who felt threatened by Jewish competition, e.g. Christian merchants 
and other competitors in professions with a high concentration of Jews (Kolstø, 2014:698-699). 
The same pattern was seen in the efforts to adopt legislation to restrict the access of Jews to 
higher education. Several conservative and nationalist lobby groups and newspapers argued 
intensely that the high increase of Jewish students at higher educations in the late nineteenth 
century, as much as 14.5% of the total number of students in 1886, would prevent the access of 
poor Russians to the same level of education (Kolstø, 2014:701). 
 
 
THE CREATION OF THE JEWISH AUTONOMOUS OBLAST 
 
In 1928 the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin created the Jewish Autonomous Oblast 
in the Russian Far East in order to settle the “Jewish question”. The Jewish Autonomous Oblast 
was created after numerous attempts in the 1920’s to create a Jewish Homeland in Ukraine and 
Crimea, which was abandoned due to resistance from the local population (Vitale, 2007: 1). 
Besides creating the Jewish Autonomous Region in the Russian Far East, there were also created 
four Jewish national regions and seventeen Jewish townships in Crimea and south Ukraine 
(Martin, 1998:825). Some of the considerations behind creating a “Jewish Homeland” in the 
Soviet Union was a wish to adapt the Jewish population to agricultural labour without local 
ethnic conflicts, as well as wishing to attract Jewish money and migrants from the Jewish 
diaspora all over the world (Vitale, 2007:2). The creation of the Jewish Autonomous Oblast was 
never an explicit demand originating from inside of the Soviet Jewish community, instead it was 
motivated by the early national policy of the Soviet Union, which attempted to create uniformity 
and inner consistency (Fabrykant, 2014:172). At the same time, Jewish communists argued that 
creating a “Soviet Zion”, where Jewish proletarian culture could develop, would function as an 
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ideological alternative to Zionism for Soviet Jews (Vitale, 2007:3). However, Jewish migration to 
the Jewish Autonomous Oblast experienced severe difficulties from its early beginning. Under 
the Great Purges in the late 30’s and after the Second World War, Jews were particularly 
exposed to persecution. Thousands of Jews were imprisoned and killed, and all Jewish 
institutions were shut down and some were even burnt down, which resulted in an abrupt stop 
of Jewish migration (Vitale, 2007:2). Another essential problem for the Jewish Autonomous 
Oblast was that the territory had no emotional or cultural attachment to the Soviet Jews and 
was located thousands of miles from the nearest concentration of Jews (Murphy, 1989:417). 
The missing attachment of Jews to the Jewish Autonomous Oblast is clearly seen by the number 
of Jewish residents and in 1939 only less than 18,000 of the Oblast’s 109,000 inhabitants were 
Jewish and in the late 80’s it was a little as less than 5% of the inhabitants that were Jewish 
(Vitale, 2007:4,2). 
 
 
THE CASE OF SOVIET JEWS AND ANTI-ZIONISM 
 
While the Soviet leaders officially always condemned anti-Semitism, it was still outspoken in the 
society of the day and among the Soviet leadership. With the establishment of the state of Israel 
they got the opportunity of reproducing traditional anti-Semitic sentiments under the name of 
anti-Zionism. Zionism was seen as the world conspiracy against socialist countries and Israel was 
seen as the spearhead in that conspiracy. (Morgenthau in Glazer et al., 1971:87). 
Looking at the historical aspect of anti-Zionism being used as a disguise for anti-Semitic 
sentiments in the Soviet Union, one could expect that Israeli immigrants from the former Soviet 
countries are more sensitive to anti-Zionist sentiments and opinions. In recent years, especially 
after the Israeli-Gaza conflict of 2014, the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement 
have won terrain and public support among Israel’s traditional allies, Europe and the United 
States (Medina & Lewin, 2015, 9 May). With reference to the history, I would argue that the 
Israelis from the former Soviet Union would be especially sensitive to the development of BDS 
and anti-Zionist sentiments among the Israeli allies.  Furthermore, some BDS movement 
activities on American campuses have developed into more obvious anti-Semitic reactions. An 
example is students at UC Davis in Sacramento, United States, chanting “allahu-akbar” at a 
political debate against pro-Israeli students and later a Jewish fraternity house was vandalised 
with swastika graffiti (Abrams, 2015, 4 February). Another recent example is a Jewish student at 
U.C.L.A. in Los Angeles, United States, almost loosing her seat at the student council after 
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accusations of being biased towards Israel because of her strong involvement in the Jewish 
community (Nagourney, 2015, 5 March).  
 
 
NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG THE ALIYAH POPULATION 
 
Stephen M. Walt mentions that an alliance is likely to dissolute if there is a change in long-term 
demographics and social trends. He mentions that this is very likely to happen if the existing 
alliance is based on some degrees of transnational links between the alliance partners, like 
common ethnic, cultural background and shared historical experiences (Walt, 1997:161). 
A study from 1970 focussing on American and Jewish identity among American settlers and non-
settlers who were just about to do their aliyah (immigration of Jews to Israel) shows the 
following: When asked if they feel closer to Israeli Jews or American non-Jews, 58 % of the 
settlers and as much as 83 % of the non-settlers said they felt closer to American non-Jews. 
Asked about if they feel more Jewish than American or more American than Jewish, 67 % of the 
settlers and as much as 87 % of the non-settlers felt more American than Jewish. (Sherrow & 
Ritterband, 1970:219). This study indicates that among Israeli-Americans there is a strong ethnic 
and cultural fellowship with their former countrymen and even among settlers, who typically 
have a stronger religious affiliation, their shared identity with the United States is still quite high. 
It would be expectable that the shared cultural and ethnic band to the former country is quite 
similar among other immigrations from Central Europe and other Western countries.  This would 
indicate that among Israelis a significant group of Israelis feel closely associated culturally and 
ethnically to Israel’s alliance partners. With the immigration of one million Jews from the former 
Soviet countries, Israel absorbed a large group of new citizens with a cultural and ethnic 
background that somehow differed from Israel’s traditional alliance partners and also from 
previous Jewish immigrants from Western countries. Furthermore, as shown above, the Jewish 
immigrants from the former Soviet countries had a much more recent experience with anti-
Semitism, persecution and anti-Zionism used as a smokescreen for anti-Semitic sentiments. 
According to Stephen M. Walt these changes in the Israeli demography could have an influence 
on the alliance between Israel and the Western countries. 
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CHANGES IN THE ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP 
 
The major change in the Israeli demography with the mass aliyah of almost one million Jews 
from the Soviet states was due to systemic changes, where the Soviet Union later dissolved as a 
state and the Soviet leadership in the late 80’s under Mikhail Gorbachev proposed the Glasnost 
reforms. These systemic changes and reforms of the Soviet society allowed Israel to successfully 
evacuate Soviet citizens with Jewish ancestry to Israel. On the contrary, the mass aliyah of Soviet 
Jews also resulted in some major regional changes internally in Israel as a result of the 
demographic changes. As discussed in this chapter, the domestic changes due to the 
demography could have some effects on the alliance relationship.  Moreover, the Soviet Jews 
did not share the common transnational cultural and historical background as shared among the 
Ashkenazi population in Israel and the Western countries. Furthermore, they also had a much 
later experience of Anti-Semitism and persecution than their Ashkenazi counterparts, making 
them more vulnerable to anti-Semitic sentiments among the population of Israel’s alliance 
partners. 
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U.S. SUPREMACY CONTESTED 
 
 
Structural realism predicts that unipolarity cannot continue to last. While the theory does not 
say how long it will take before unipolarity will be challenged, it says that eventually a new 
balance of power will emerge (Waltz, 2000:30). The prediction is backed by several historical 
events where different regimes tried to win hegemony over Europe and eventually was defeated 
by other powers, however United States still posses a considerable amount of power over their 
closets rivals, as well as technological and organisational superiority (Layne, 2009:150; Paul, 
2005:50). 
Arguments against a continuation of unipolarity is that the unipolar hegemon will take on too 
many tasks beyond their own borders, which, in the long run, will weaken their power. Another 
explanation is that, even though the unipolar hegemon act in a respectful manner, weaker states 
will continue to worry about the future behaviour of the hegemon. Furthermore, a state of 
unipolarity is a state of unbalanced power, which will result in stronger states trying to increase 
their own strength or trying to align with others to bring the international power into balance. 
(Ibid.:28). 
Some predictions suggest that the European Union would try to soft-balance or leash-slip the 
United States (Posen, 2006; Layne, 2006). However, until now it seems that Europe and their 
leaders have not been able to develop a united foreign and military policy, and as long as there 
is limited willingness to create a united foreign and military policy, European power would be 
limited (Waltz, 2000:31-32). 
Some of the current signs of a possibility of waning U.S. hegemony could be the fiscal crisis, with 
the possibility of political pressure to make considerable cuts on the defence budgets with the 
consequence of retracting from their international military commitments (Layne, 2009:169). 
Furthermore, the expenses of the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been costly, with 
the war in Iraq calculated to a total cost of $3 trillion, and financed by borrowing money, rather 
than raising taxes (Layne, 2012:6). 
Another sign of American hegemonic decline could be the broader trend of economic power 
shifting away from the Euro-Atlantic core towards emerging markets, like China, where their 
long-term goal was not only to get wealthy but also to get wealthy enough to acquire military 
capabilities to challenge United States over regional hegemony in East Asia (Layne, 2012:3). In 
this situation, where China sees the United States in decline and while their own growth would 
confirm China in their rise to great-power status, it is likely that China will challenge United 
States over regional hegemony (ibid.).  
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CHANGES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY GOALS 
 
With the Obama administration, the United States introduced a new geopolitical grand strategy, 
known as the Pivot. Two main axes define the Pivot: Retrenchment from the Middle Eastern and 
European area and, secondly, “counterpunching” by reaffirming American influence and military 
presence in key Asia-Pacific theatres (Dian, 2015:238). According to the then-Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton, the political ambition of allocating political and military interests towards the 
Asia-Pacific region is to secure the continuation of American unipolar leadership (Clinton, 
2011:57). Hillary Clinton presented the Pivot as six key lines of action: Strengthening bilateral 
security alliances; deepening the working relationship with emerging powers, including China; 
engaging with regional multilateral institutions; expanding trade and investment; forging a 
broad-based military presence; and advancing democracy and human rights (ibid.:58). 
At the same time, the U.S. administration assessed that the U.S. used too many resources in 
costly state building efforts in the Middle East, and hence giving China free reign to build up their 
capabilities and influence in the Asia-Pacific region (Dian, 2015:239).  Looking at the new alliance 
trends, as a consequence of the Pivot, United States started a diplomatic effort leading to a 
bilateral détente with their former adversaries Vietnam and Myanmar, as well as them 
reinforcing their existing regional alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia (ibid.:204). As 
early as in 2010, strong diplomatic and military efforts were made by the Obama administration 
to rebalance their foreign policy interests, in order to tackle possible challengers to U.S. primacy 
in the Asia-Pacific. Hillary Clinton urged Cambodia to balance against China, by raising the issues 
of Chinese dams on the Mekong River, Obama made official visits to Indonesia and India, with 
the purpose of strengthen the diplomatic relationship, and in 2010 United States held more than 
half of their military exercises in East Asia, with the intention of raising their military profile in 
the region significantly (Ling, 2013:149). Furthermore, the then-Secretary of Defence Leon 
Panetta stated in his address to the Shangri-La Security Dialog in 2012 that by 2020 60 % of all 
U.S. warships would be deployed to the Pacific (ibid.:150); making it clear that the aim of United 
States is to rebalance their military capacities and interests away from other regions towards 
the Pacific.  
 
 
U.S. STRATEGIES TO MAINTAIN UNIPOLAR HEGEMONY 
 
Offensive realism predicts that if the rapid economic growth of China continues in the future, 
then they will try to dominate Asia and attempt to achieve regional hegemony; however the 
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United States will do its utmost to prevent China from achieving regional hegemony 
(Mearsheimer, 2014:361-362). Offensive realism tells us that China will seek regional hegemony 
as the position of such is the best way to survive under international anarchy; the more 
dominant position China has, the more able they will be to settle territorial disputes favourably 
(ibid.:368). As John J. Mearsheimer (ibid:364) states it, there is no 9-1-1 you can call when a 
hostile state is knocking at your door, and therefore states must recognise that they must take 
care of their own survival. 
If we look at the military build-up in United States and China, the projected defence 
expenditures suggest a future security competition between the two states, with United States 
using $417 billion in 2010 and projected to use $808 in 2030, and China using $88 in 2010 and 
projected to use $238 in 2030 (Ikenberry, 2008:37). The most likely way the United States will 
deal with the Chinese quest for regional hegemony is containment. United States will try to 
prevent China from using its military force to conquer new territory, form a balancing coalition 
with the Chinese neighbouring states, as well as securing its domination on the oceans, 
preventing China from expanding its power into distant regions (ibid.:384-385). As already 
mentioned, those strategies are already pursued in the Pivot, by the United States strengthening 
its diplomatic ties with China’s neighbours and with the ambition that in 2020 60 % of all U.S. 
warships should be deployed to the Pacific (Ling, 2013:149-150). 
 
 
POSSIBILITIES OF A SINO-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP 
 
 If the United States’ influence and power is to wane over time, it should be expected that their 
leverage over Israeli policy would decline as well. Israel has tried several times to establish a 
relationship to China with the purpose of exporting their military industrial products and 
technology. As former Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Arens in 1992 concluded, the Israeli 
industrial base is so microscopic compared to U.S., so they have no other options than exporting 
its military products to the rest of the world, even to China (Kumaraswamy, 2013:149). As 
expected, the United States has not willingly accepted that one of their alliance partners tried 
to establish ties of selling advanced military equipment and knowhow to China and have 
previously done whatever in their power to prevent such a relationship. One of these clashes 
between United States and Israel over military sale to China was Israel’s decision to upgrade the 
Harpy UAV’s they sold to China in the early 1990s, which finally was cancelled by Ehud Barak in 
2000 after severe U.S. pressure and accusations against Israel (ibid.:152-153).  An example of 
successful military technological transfer from Israel to China was the technology from the Lavi 
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combat fighter project. As mentioned in the previous chapter about Israeli military industry, 
Israel was forced to cancel the combat fighter project in 1987 due to extreme pressure from the 
United States. To compensate for the loss of jobs due to the cancellation, Israel assumedly 
started to collaborate with China in the late 80’s/early 90’s and on the development of the 
Chinese F-10 fighter project (Kumaraswamy, 2006:395). Looking at the current Chinese J-10 
Chengdu combat fighter, it bears some striking similarities with the cancelled Israeli Lavi combat 
fighter, strongly supporting the accusations of Sino-Israeli cooperation and Israeli transfer of 
technology to China.  
However, with American interests in the Middle East being relocated to the Asia-Pacific, Israeli 
influence would become less relevant in Washington, as well as the U.S. leverage on Israeli policy 
being destined to wane, it could quite well open the possibility of a stronger Sino-Israeli 
relationship in the future (Clinton, 2010:57; Kumaraswamy, 2013:156). 
 
 
EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCES 
 
With the United States allocating most of its military and political resources from the Middle 
East to the East-Pacific, in order to balance China, Israel’s importance to the United States will 
by nature wane.  
At the same time, if Israel does not feel that they get any political benefits from their alliance 
with United States, it should be expected that Israel would try to look for other alliance 
possibilities with better political benefits. If the U.S. influence will wane over time, as well as 
their strategist interests shifts away from the Middle East, their leverage on Israeli policy will by 
nature be less, which could open possibilities of Israel seeking alliance possibilities with China. 
Furthermore, if Israel is successful in pursuing fracking and oil shale projects, it could potentially 
end Israel’s dependency of oil bought from the global market and make them independent of 
the United States guaranteeing Israel’s oil and energy requirements in the time of crisis, as they 
agreed upon in the 1975 US-Israeli Memorandum of Agreement, as I have explained in the 
previous chapter about the Camp David Peace agreement. Projects like Israel Energy Initiatives 
do seek to end the Israeli dependency on foreign oil and energy (see their web page: www.iei-
energy.com). 
To summarise, the systemic changes of US security interests away from the Middle East and 
towards the Asia-Pacific region, due to the of future intensification of the Sino-American security 
competition, would definitely have considerable effects on the robustness of the US-Israeli 
alliance and could possibly open up for new Israeli alliance partners.  
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INTEGRATION OF 
EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY 
 
 
Over the last few years the European Parliament and other European Union institutions have 
been more outspoken in their support for the claims of the Palestinian Authorities and their 
criticism of the policies of the Israeli government. Making different resolutions conflicting with 
the official policies of Israel. One recent example is the “European Parliament resolution on 
Israel-Palestine after the Gaza war and the role of the EU” (European Parliament, 2014). In the 
European Parliament resolution as a response to the Gaza conflict, some of the statements 
would clearly conflict with the policies and security needs of Israel. Some examples is that the 
European Parliament “strongly denounces the Israeli military aggression on Gaza” (ibid.:5), 
demands the release of 7.000 Palestinian prisoners (ibid.), calls for an international committee 
to investigate Israeli war crimes during the conflict (ibid.), calls on the EU to impose a ban on 
arms exports to Israel and prohibit all arms imports from Israel into EU and immediately to end 
all cooperation with Israel in the framework of European Defence Agency (ibid.:6). 
If you look at those statements it seems like there is a major crack in the alliance between Israel 
and the European Union, with the resolution also calling on directly abandoning Israel at some 
stages, exemplified through a possible import and export arms embargo and ending cooperation 
with Israel in the European Defence Agency. The Operation Protective Edge of 2014 is not the 
first, where Israeli military actions have brought them on a political collision course with the 
European Union. Under the second Intifada from 2000-2005, the European Union and the Israeli 
government was on several occasions on collision course, e.g. the European Union was 
outspoken critical about the Operation Defensive Shield in 2002 and the decision to build the 
West Bank barrier (Marzano, 2013:106-107). While some might suggest that the European 
Union is acting to protect the humanitarian rights of the Palestinian people, as the resolution of 
2014 emphasises several times, it is, however, more likely that the European Union is acting on 
behalf of European geo-strategic interests. During the visit in 2005 of the then EU Parliamentary 
President Josep Borrell Fontelles, affiliated to the Social Democratic parliament group PES (now 
S&D), said: 
 
“…the conflict in the Middle East is dangerous for us. We are not just here, as the good 
guy who says, please do not fight between you. We need this conflict to be finished 
because of its impact on life in Europe” (Miller, 2006:661). 
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Indicating that the conflict between Israel and Palestine has a considerable impact on the 
security of the European states, as EU is located geographical close to the Middle East and does 
not have an ocean separating them from the conflict, like the United States.  
 
 
ISRAELI RELATIONS WITH THE EU MEMBER STATES 
 
While the official policies of the European Union institutions might suggest some major cracks 
in the alliance between Israel and the European Union members, it is, however, relevant to look 
at how well Israel cooperate with the individual member states of the European Union and if 
the alliance relationship has been affected by the critical policies of the European Union. 
 
Even though Israel and France have had a troubled relationship on several occasions since the 
French arms embargo of 1967, the Franco-Israeli trade almost doubled through to 1990s and of 
2005, Israel was France’s sixth largest export market and France was the third biggest Israeli 
partner in scientific and technological research, which resulted in the establishment in 2004 of 
an common institution to promote scientific cooperation and research (Miller, 2006:659).  
 
Some of Israel’s most essential military equipment is acquired from the Germany, where the 
German government on several occasions have directly subsidised Israel’s purchase of arms. 
One example is the strategic important Dolphin-class submarines, produced by ThyssenKrupp 
subsidiary company Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (Ferber & Maltz, 2015, 12 May).  The 
Dolphin-class submarines were essential to Israel’s strategic aims of getting second-strike 
capability in the event of a nuclear strike (ibid.). Furthermore, Israel played an essential part of 
the development of the German army’s arms system and has improved the overall battlefield 
capability of the German army significantly (Shpiro, 2002:37). Since 1956, Israel and Germany 
has also had an on-going intelligence cooperation between the German intelligence service, 
Bundesnachrichtendienst, and the Israeli intelligence service, Mossad (Ibid.:32-33). 
 
One of the most outspoken critics of Israeli policies in the European Union has been Sweden. In 
2014, Sweden was the first Western European EU member country to officially recognise 
Palestine, and ignored Israeli protests and U.S. pressure saying that a Palestinian state could 
only come through a negotiated solution between Israelis and Palestinians (Agence France – 
Presse in Stockholm, 2014, 30 October).  Some historical sources credit the shift in Swedish-
Israeli relations as a result of the Yom Kippur War. In the early days of the Israeli state, Sweden’s 
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foreign policy was generally pro-Israeli. After the Yom Kippur War, Sweden experienced oil 
shortage, with severe consequences for their industry, which underlined the importance of 
strengthening their friendly relations with the Arab states and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (Abadi, 2001:24). Moreover, with the rise of Olof Palme as Swedish Prime Minister, 
the differences became more ideological and Sweden’s criticism of Israel intensified, while their 
relations towards the Arab States, including the PLO, became much sympathetic (Abadi, 
2001:33). However, even though Swedens official foreign policy towards Israel in general, is seen 
as one of the most critical of the European Union, and probably one of the most supportive of 
critical policies of the European Union institutions, it does not prevent Sweden and Israel from 
having relatively close relations on military affairs. One example of the relatively close military 
relations between Israel and Sweden is that the Israeli company Elbit Systems was selected for 
the integration and delivery of their Passive Airborne Warning System (PAWS-2) to the Swedish 
Gripen fighter aircraft (Elbit Systems, 2013, 3 December). Integrating an electronic warfare 
system on a fighter aircraft would demand a high level of cooperation and shared technical 
information. Furthermore, the Swedish military purchased 48 Skylark unmanned aerial vehicles, 
renamed as “The Falcon”, also from the Israeli Company, Elbit Systems, which primarily has been 
used as surveillance for the soldiers in Afghanistan (Försvarsmakten, n.d.). This shows that even 
though the official governmental rhetoric from Sweden sometimes sounds quite harsh against 
Israel, the military establishment and industry still enjoy close ties, which would indicate that on 
several important strategic issues, Sweden continues to be dependent on a close cooperation 
and relationship to Israel. 
 
 
If we look at the arms export from European countries to Israel, it is clear that a very active 
relationship still exists. In 2007, the European member states authorised arms export licenses 
to Israel worth a total of almost €200 million; with France, Germany and Romania as the top 
three exporters, with France on €126 million, Germany on €28 million and Romania on €17 
million respectively (Phillips, 2009, 7 January). 
 
 
EFFECTS ON THE ALLIANCE 
 
As this study shows, there is a notable divergence between the official political rhetoric towards 
Israel from the European Union institutions and the way that the individual European Union 
member act in practice.  This would indicate that the alliance relationship between Israel and 
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the European states in everyday practice, is not affected by the different condemnations of 
Israeli military actions and policies from the European Union. One example of this is the 2008-
2009 Gaza conflict, Operation Cast Lead, where the European Union condemned Israel for 
disproportionate use of force. Although the official European rhetoric from Brussels was 
condemning Israel in strong sentences, the then-Israeli primer minister Ehud Olmert praised the 
European leaders under the war for their extraordinary support for the state of Israel. (Del Sarto, 
2011:122). 
Given the divergence in the political positions towards Israel, it is possible that we in the future 
will experience more severe cracks and differences between the European Union and Israel, if 
the European Union is successful in strengthening the integration of their foreign policy. In 2000, 
Kenneth N. Waltz saw the European Union as a candidate of becoming the next Great Power if 
they would be as successful in integrating their military and foreign policy as they were in 
integrating their national economies (Waltz, 2000:31). However, the European Union have 
traditionally had difficulties in agreeing upon a common platform of security and foreign policy. 
One example was the disunity among the European Union member states about whether to 
participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Another current example are the massive refugee 
flows from North Africa and the Middle East, where it seems like that the European Union is 
unable to agree upon a common strategy, despite the situation having had a massive impact on 
the Southern European countries. It is possible that we in the future will see systemic changes 
of integration of European foreign policy, which will result in a change of the alliance 
relationship. It is worth considering that even if we see a full integration of the European foreign 
policy, and if the European Union institutions continue their critical approach to Israeli security 
and military policy, the European countries and Israel still have shared geo-strategic interests in 
the security concerns of the Middle East, as well as common economic interests in trading 
operations, including arms trade. Therefore, it is improbable that the European Union will 
abandon Israel as their alliance. However, cracks in the relationship are expected to appear in 
time. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this master thesis, I have documented several systemic, domestic and regional factors that 
could potentially cause a crack in the alliance relationship between Israel and the Western 
countries. It is important to note, that I do not see any developments in the alliance relationship 
indicating that the alliance partners should be anywhere near abandoning each other. However, 
I have discovered some regional, domestic and systemic factors that according to the alliance 
theory could indicate that the alliance relationship has changed and has become less hard-
knitted over the years. 
 
If we look at the regional factor, The Camp David Peace Agreement of 1979 between Israel and 
Egypt changed Israel’s regional power in the Middle East. Making peace with Egypt, Israel 
eliminated their single-strongest threat. After signing the peace agreement with Egypt, Israel did 
not face any imminent existential threat against them anymore. The United States became less 
important in guaranteeing Israeli security. However, the United States was still an important 
alliance partner for Israel, as they relied on the United States to protect the peace agreement 
with Egypt. 
 
Among the domestic factors some strategic and internal changes have had an impact on the 
alliance.  
Israel has over the years made a large internal balancing effort, where they have deliberately 
sought to be less dependent on their alliance partners. Israel has over the years been successful 
in building a large domestic military industry, which have made them self-sufficient on most key 
strategic military weaponry. Israel being less dependent on alliance partners to equip Israel with 
military arms, has given their alliance partners less leverage over Israeli policy. As documented 
in the master thesis, alliance partners have several times in history cancelled or suspended 
shipments of military arms as a “blackmailing tool” to get leverage over Israeli security policy.  
By developing a nuclear deterrence as the only state in the Middle East, changed the Israeli 
security situation drastically. Being a regional nuclear hegemon changed the regional balance of 
power ultimately as Israel could deter its rival states by threatening to annihilate them, making 
it very unlikely that other states would make existential threats against Israel. A strategic gain 
was, that Israel became less dependent of their alliance partners in the case of an imminent 
threat against Israel’s existence. Israel strategically sought to acquire nuclear weapons, as they 
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did not want to rely on friendly countries to save them in the case of an obvious conventional 
military defeat.  
Another internal domestic factor that have affected the Israeli alliance relationship, is the 
demographic changes Israel experienced at the end of the Cold War, where almost one million 
Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union. The demographic changes in Israel could have an effect 
on their alliance relationship, as the Soviet Jews did not share the same common transnational 
cultural and historical background as the Israeli Ashkenazi population shared with their Western 
counterparts. Furthermore, Soviet Jews had a much later experience with anti-Semitism and 
persecution, making them more vulnerable to anti-Semitic sentiments among the Israel’s 
alliance partners. 
 
On a systemic level, several systemic factors have over the years affected the alliance and have 
caused some cracks in the alliance. With the end of the Cold War and the systemic changes 
caused by that, Israel became less strategically important for their Western allies.  
Under the Cold War, Israel was central for the United States and the other Western countries in 
order to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the Middle East. As described in the master 
thesis, the U.S.-Israeli alliance relationship has been subject to considerable criticism from two 
of the prominent American international relations scholars, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen 
M. Walt. Where John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt saw Israel as a strategic asset during 
the Cold War, they now regard Israel as being a strategic liability as they see the alliance as 
jeopardising the security of the United States, because the close alliance relationship has a 
negative effect on Arabic and Islamic opinion towards the United States. 
With the new global security situation with China as an emerging regional superpower and the 
United States trying to balance China in order to protect their unipolarity, it is expected that the 
United States will use fewer resources in the Middle East. With the new geopolitical grand 
strategy, the Pivot, the United States seek to retrench from the Middle East and Europe and 
reaffirm American influence and military presence in key Asia-Pacific theatres. The systemic 
changes and the intensification of the Sino-American security competition will result in the 
United States using fewer resources on Israeli interests. Furthermore, the rise of China could 
also result in possible new alliance relationships for Israel. China and Israel have already 
cooperated on military projects and military arms trade, and it is possible that this could 
intensify in the future. 
Lastly, I have documented how there is a divergence between the official policy of the European 
Union institutions and the individual European Union member states towards Israel. The 
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the individual member states. If the systemic development results in a closer integration of 
European foreign policy, it is to be expected that we would experience more severe cracks in 
the alliance between Israel and the European Union.  
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AFTERTHOUGHTS 
 
 
In the master thesis, I have given one explanation on the changes in the alliance relationship 
between Israel and the Western countries. Systemic, domestic and regional changes can give 
one credible explanation. However, there could still be other explanations worth researching. It 
could be relevant documenting whether the internal political situation in the different countries 
could have an effect on the alliance relationship. It could be worth documenting whether 
differences in political ideology between the Israeli government and the governments of their 
alliance partners could have a negative effect on the alliance relationship. 
Another factor, I have not considered in the master thesis is how it would affect Israel’s alliance 
relationship if Russia is to strengthen their geo-political interests in the Middle East. Russia still 
has considerable geo-political interests in the Middle East and the latest development indicates 
that they are trying to extend their interests in the region. With the worsened relationship 
between the European Union/United States and Russia, it could be relevant to consider what an 
impact Russian presence in the Middle East could have on Israel’s alliance relationship. 
I have delimited myself from conducting qualitative elite interviews. However, if I had the 
resources to conduct a reliable amount of data from interviews, it would be relevant to consider 
how people working professionally with Israeli diplomacy analyse the developments in the 
Israeli alliance relationship. 
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